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In February, 1966, *Current History* hopes to offer our readers additional insight into the current situation in Vietnam and into the difficult problems this struggle now poses for the United States and for the world at large. In an effort to set both Vietnams into historical perspective and into the wider Southeast Asian context, informed observers will review the following pertinent areas:

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Land and People

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by C. PAUL BRADLEY, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Flint College;

The U. S. in Southeast Asia

by WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE, Professor of Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

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CURRENT History

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In this second of a two-issue study on Latin America, seven specialists review recent developments in Central America. The first specialist in this area, in addition to outlining the economic difficulties that Panama faces—with or without a new sea-level canal treaty—points out that “Political unsteadiness is not new to the Isthmus. It has accompanied the white minority rule of a predominantly mestizo and mulatto country, where democratic processes, such as fair elections, have been honored more in theory than in practice.”

The Challenge in Panama

By LARRY L. PIPPIN

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Elbert Covell College,
University of the Pacific*

PANAMA HAS A plethora of problems. The economic and political questions confronting the isthmian nation are both old and new. All of them are affected, in one way or another, by the changing relationship between Panama and the United States.

Following the announcement by President Lyndon B. Johnson on December 18, 1964, that the United States was prepared to build a sea-level canal across Central America and to replace the 1903 Panama Canal treaty, deliberation between the United States and Panama got under way. The order of priority followed in the talks was that established by Panama and the basic discussions concerned the replacement treaty for the 1903 document. A sea-level waterway and defense considerations were to be covered under separate treaties.

The first of the new instruments was to be based upon Panama's demands for a share in the management and profits of the existing waterway. Spelled out, the demands in-

cluded the termination of the existing system of government in the Canal Zone. The Panamanians wanted the right to legislate for the region, as well as the power to administer justice. Panama asked that, with few exceptions, services in the Zone be provided exclusively by Panama.

It was the intent of Panama clearly to establish the sovereignty of that nation over the waterway. Panama did not want its dominion in the Zone affected by any rights, power, or authority granted to the United States with respect to operating the Canal. All ships using the Canal would fly the Panamanian flag while in transit. Panama's tax laws would be enforced in the Canal Zone. Jurisdiction and authority over, as well as the administration of, the waterway itself would be the joint responsibility of Panama and the United States.

Panama called upon the United States to return to the Republic lands, islands, waters, drydocks, ports, and airports which were no longer necessary for the actual operation of

the Canal. The isthmian Republic wanted the Zone opened to agriculture and livestock raising, as well as to trade, commerce, and industry, which would be under the jurisdiction of Panama law. Further, Panama requested that it receive concessions enabling it to export more of its products to the United States. Residents of the Republic, Panama insisted, should have equal opportunities for employment in the Canal's operations. In addition, Panama wanted Panamanian stamps used exclusively in the Canal Zone postal system and Spanish to become the only official language of the Canal Zone government.

Panama claimed that the right to fix tolls on ships and cargo passing through the Canal should fall to that nation actually sovereign over the waterway. Panamanian authorities held that tolls should be levied on the value of the cargo, rather than on the basis of the cargo-carrying capacity of a ship, as under the present plan. According to the Panama formula, expensive cargo should pay more than is currently collected, while cheap bulk cargo should pay, perhaps, even less than it now pays.

Six weeks after the Johnson statement, Secretary of the Army Stephen T. Ailes and the then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, departed for Central and South America to hold exploratory talks on the building of the new sea-level waterway. The countries visited by the American officials were those containing the best possible canal sites: Panama, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. These visits were the first of a series of steps that would have to be taken. The Washington government would have to make site surveys to determine the best route for any sea-level construction. The surveys, in turn, would have to be preceded by bilateral agreements indicating the willingness of the Latin countries to be host to the proposed canal.

In their conversations, the Americans attempted to remove the Latins' "emotional blocs" on such questions as sovereignty, operation, and revenues. The line followed by the negotiators in their talks with the Latin

American officials was that the United States would not make demands affecting the sovereignty of any host nation. However, the host nation would have to acknowledge that it had no right to restrict access to the waterway nor to set tolls unilaterally. The major United States requirement was said to be that any treaty guarantee the "right of access on a non-discriminatory basis at a reasonable toll." Regarding the right of access and the determination of tolls, Washington was ready to accept in principle the participation of some international group. And, although they encountered more difficulty in Panama than in the other countries visited, Giles and Mann reported, upon returning, that a successful exchange of views had been achieved.

The Johnson administration asked the Senate appropriations subcommittee to provide \$7.5 million for financing the work of an Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. The multimillion dollar request was for the partial financing of route studies in Panama, as well as in Central America and Colombia. In August, 1965, the United States President urged Congress to take prompt action on the \$7.5 million request so that the actual surveying in Panama could begin in January, 1966, during the dry season. Completion of the route studies would take three years. A new sea-level passage would require ten years to dig.

WINNING A WATERWAY

Well before the original 1903 Panama Canal Treaty a transisthmian canal had been a long-standing goal of the United States. It was a basic necessity for a country with two coasts so distant from one another. However, for the goal to be realized, the projected waterway had to be built and protected by the United States. Great Britain respected United States designs on the Isthmus. Colombia did not. Thus, Washington found it necessary to resort to other means to achieve its canal. The coveted opportunity was soon to present itself.

The Panamanians had long regretted their decision in 1821 to join neighboring Colombia. During several periods in the nineteenth

century separatist campaigns flourished on the Isthmus. A short-lived "Sovereign State of the Isthmus" was formed in 1855, and when a chaotic Colombia was recovering from the Thousand Days War (1899-1902), its most recent period of severe internal disorder, the independence movement revived.

Panama could count on powerful allies in 1903. The concession to French private interests for the construction of a waterway was about to revert to Colombia. The capitalists from Gaul stood to lose their investment unless they could sell their holdings. The United States could not buy the French company's assets until it had gained the legal right to construct an interoceanic waterway. The Colombian congress had just closed the door on the United States' isthmian objectives by rejecting the Hay-Herrán Treaty.

Panamanians, aided by the Frenchman Philippe Bunau Varilla, then obtained the support of the United States government for their November, 1903, separation maneuver against Colombia. When the ranking officers in the expeditionary force sent by Colombia to put down the latest outbreak of Panamanian insubordination crossed the Isthmus ahead of their troops, the latter were not allowed to follow because of the menacing presence of United States warships and lack of cooperation of United States troops and railroad officials. For, by coincidence, the United States possessed the right to keep order on the route of the United States-built transisthmian railroad. Three days after the declaration of November 3, proclaiming the independence of Panama from Colombia, the new regime on the Isthmus was recognized by the United States as the *de facto* government of Panama. *De jure* recognition followed on November 13.

Although the Panamanians had willingly utilized a great power to gain their independence, they were not psychologically prepared to pay the humiliating price demanded for the cooperation. A treaty embodying gener-

ous concessions to the United States was negotiated by United States Secretary of State John Hay and the soon-to-be-despised Bunau Varilla and was signed on November 18, 1903. The alternative to accepting the conditions imposed on the tiny isthmian nation by the pact was a possible withdrawal of the United States guarantee of Panamanian independence, without which the fledgling nation would undoubtedly have fallen once again before the relatively overwhelming might of Colombia.

The most objectionable treaty concession made by the new Panamanian government was that conceding sovereignty over the waterway to the United States "in perpetuity." In addition, Panama was saddled with a provision allowing for unilateral intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the isthmian Republic. Vexing, too, was the right of the United States to take any Panamanian territory outside of the Canal Zone that it wanted, if it was thought necessary for the maintenance, operation, sanitation, and defense of the Canal. Also annoying was the annuity provision of the Hay-Bunau Varilla accord.¹ Panamanians were equally displeased with the competition that retail outlets in the Zone represented to commerce in the Republic.

A revision movement took root almost immediately. A 1904 convention, drawn up by United States Secretary of War William H. Taft, proved beneficial for Panamanian business. When the United States government made known that it would no longer abide by the Taft agreement, the Panamanians pushed for a renegotiation of the canal treaty. The limited concessions made by the United States were incorporated into the Treaty of 1926. The Panamanian National Assembly angrily rejected the 1926 instrument.

The approach of World War II, the fence-mending "Good Neighbor" policy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration and the world economic crisis precipitated a renegotiation of portions of the 1903 pact. The Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1936 netted numerous gains for the isthmian nation. Although there were no concessions made by the United

¹ The \$250,000 annual payment to Panama for the combined transisthmian railroad and ship canal concessions was the same amount that had been previously paid to the Colombian government for the railroad rights alone.

States on the sovereignty issue, the northern nation agreed to end the protectorate status of Panama by forfeiting the 1903 right to intervene unilaterally in its internal affairs. The United States government promised to reduce commercial activities in the Zone, which competed with like activities in the Republic. The United States gave up its right of eminent domain in the cities of Panama and Colón. An adjustment in the annuity (from \$250,000 to \$430,000) was made to compensate for a devaluation of United States currency in 1934. Beyond this the United States agreed to permit Panama to join in the defense of the waterway—a provision detailed in a separate treaty, signed in 1942.

Non-compliance by the United States with certain provisions of existing treaties, and changed conditions after World War II, caused a renewal of the revision movement. A treaty on defense sites was negotiated in 1947. After the 1947 bases pact was rejected by Panama, the United States would not engage in revision talks. When strong man Colonel José Antonio "Chichi" Remón gained the presidency of Panama in 1952, in what was interpreted as a stabilizing move, he undertook an "integral revision" of the treaties with the United States. The new Dwight D. Eisenhower administration proved willing to make some concessions to Panama in areas other than sovereignty. The United States reiterated its intention of reducing the level of commercial activity in the Canal Zone. Real property outside of the Zone no longer needed for the operation of the Canal was returned to the Republic. The annuity was to be increased to \$1,930,000. A single basic wage scale was devised for all North Americans and Panamanians employed in the Zone. The isthmians were to be given additional employment opportunities in the Zone.

Subsequent to the 1955 Remón-Eisenhower Treaty, the United States did make some concessions on the sovereignty issue. In the aftermath of the 1959 invasions of the Canal Zone by Panamanian elements, President Eisenhower approved a plan allowing "visual

evidence" of Panama's "titular sovereignty" over the Canal Zone. At a designated spot along the Canal Zone border, a Panamanian flag was allowed to fly next to the United States banner. The incoming Kennedy administration, after exchanging views in Washington with the then president of Panama, Robert F. Chiari, set up a joint commission to handle the flag issue and other outstanding problems between the two countries. Before the commission disbanded, it agreed to the flying of Panama's flag alongside that of the United States at most outdoor sites where the United States standard was flown by civilian authorities. Representatives of the two nations agreed that foreign consuls possessing exequaturs issued by the Republic of Panama might perform their functions in the Canal Zone. A binational labor advisory committee was authorized to consider labor disputes in the Zone.

At the beginning of 1964, when United States officials were carrying out their orders to display the colors of both nations at pre-arranged locations in the Canal Zone, a flag incident at Balboa High School erupted in violence taking the lives of 21 Panamanians and 4 United States soldiers. Panama ended diplomatic relations with the United States, and discussion of outstanding differences was not resumed until after relations were reestablished in April, 1964.

A CANAL ECONOMY

The economy of Panama has been characterized neither by diversity nor flexibility. A canal economy, it has become geared to the provision of goods and services for the operation and maintenance of the waterway. Panama admits that some 60 per cent of its foreign exchange comes from the canal sector. Frequently the Panama Canal generates annual expenditures in Panama—related to the maintenance, operation, protection, and sanitation of the Canal—equal to the total amount of the Panamanian budget. The United States government is the largest employer on the Isthmus, presently hiring around 16,000 Panamanians.

. Much consideration has been given to the

problems of diversifying the economy of Panama, but little in that direction has been accomplished. The elemental development of commercial agriculture has been strongly influenced by foreign capital and technicians. However, their impact on the nation's agriculture has been negligible. Panama's farming methods have been equated with those existing in the time of the Pharaohs. Because of the primitive nature of the rural economy, it has been argued that industrialization is the panacea for Panama. There are many factors aligned against this course, not the least of which is the lack of purchasing power of most Panamanian citizens.

Fiscal "tightness" has characterized national finances in the last decades. Budgetary deficits have become the rule. The deficit for the current fiscal year was expected to be in excess of 2.5 million balboas (one balboa = \$1 U.S.). Collections were expected to reach 84 million balboas, or 11 million more than the amount collected during the preceding fiscal period. The increase was attributed to partial tax reforms and the application of stringent collection methods. The situation will not appreciably change until the tax structure has been modernized and made more progressive. The enforcement machinery must be institutionalized and not made dependent on the zeal of a given finance minister.

Panamanian authorities have sought increases in revenue from other sources. The government has installed gaming casinos. It has instructed consular officials to solicit additional registrations of ships under Panama's flag of convenience. A select committee appointed by President Marco H. Robles was expected to recommend a six-million balboa issue of gold coins, on which the government could anticipate considerable profit from both the seigniorage and any premium assessed over their face value. Robles' attempt to gain an additional 2.5 million balboas through increased custom duties was defeated in the National Assembly.

The burden of servicing the external and internal debt, currently costing more than \$12 million a year, precludes the possibility of large-scale borrowing from international sources. Even so, Panama obtained a \$3.5 million budget support loan from the United States in October, 1965. The loan, at 4.5 per cent interest payable in 10 years, was to cover outstanding local debts of the Panamanian government and to stimulate business. In spite of the problems its repayment might cause, the loan was justified by the fiscal authorities on the basis of its beneficial short-term effect.

One of the economic features of the canal treaty being negotiated in 1965² was a provision calling for greater participation by Panama in the profits of the organization. Some Panamanian officials have revived the recommendation of a decade ago for a 50-50 split of gross revenues from the waterway. Whatever the formula decided upon, more toll revenue from ships transiting the Canal will find its way into the Panamanian treasury annually than at any time since the construction of the waterway.

Unusual circumstances, such as the 1964 riots, with their consequent slowdown of commercial activity and tourism, have aggravated the financial picture. While the economic growth rate in 1964 reached 5.7 per cent, that for 1965 was expected to be above 10 per cent.

A disaster-level unemployment situation persists in spite of an impressive growth rate. It is estimated that around 25 per cent of the working force is idle. Canal operation and maintenance requires fewer workers each year. Strikes of workers continue to beset the Robles administration. Panama's unemployment index only increases the pressures on the seriously overpopulated terminal cities of Panama and Colón, burdened by a high rate of population growth (2.8 per cent each year nationally) and internal migration. The housing situation in Panama, urban as well as rural, is among the most desperate in the world. Although one-fourth of its annual budget is allocated to education, Panama counts more illiterates each year.

² For the September 25, 1965, progress report on this treaty by President Johnson, see *Current Documents* in this issue, page 49.

PARTISAN STRIFE

Today the political life of Panama is unstable. Political unsteadiness is not new to the Isthmus.³ It has accompanied the white minority rule of a predominantly mestizo and mulatto country, where democratic processes, such as fair elections, have been honored more in theory than in practice. Although coups are incessantly in preparation, there have been no successful attempts to overthrow the government since 1955.⁴

The erosion of Robles' public support began with the controversy over the fairness of the 1964 elections. Once in office, Robles honored certain campaign commitments. One of them called for his instituting long overdue tax reforms. Higher income groups, which had supported Robles, turned on his government because of its fiscal policies.

The main opposition to Robles, outside his own tricky coalition of electoral groups, comes from twice-deposed ex-President (1940-1941; 1949-1951) Arnulfo Arias, Robles' principal opponent in the 1964 presidential race. Arias' Panameñista Party is bigger than any other and has the most representatives in the National Assembly. From that strategic location, the political allies of Arias have been obstreperous; they even boycotted Robles' address opening the 1965 session of the assembly, alleging that Robles had usurped the presidential office. However, it is unlikely that Arias' militant *Panameñistas* would succeed in any coup attempt because of the opposition to Arias and his followers presented by the leadership of Panama's *Guardia Nacional*, a 3,000-man armed force. Probably Arias is exploiting the canal treaty issue to heighten his image before the electorate as a defender of national interests. A skilful politician, as well as an undeclared candidate for the presidency in 1968, Arias has rallied most of the opposition to Robles

in a United Front movement. Ostensibly, the purpose of the Front is to curb any intervention by Washington in the internal affairs of Panama.

Operating secretly, the outlawed Communist Party has seized upon the negotiation issue in an effort to weaken the Robles government. The student movement, one of the strongest pressure groups in Panamanian politics, has recently been plagued with internal strife to such an extent that it has not taken a leading role in the antitreaty activity.

Most of the opposition manifested against the Panamanian government has fitted within the bounds of conventional political warfare. When it was reported that the Guaymí Indians of western Panama were about to turn to guerrilla activity, the Robles government moved rapidly to meet their demands. The existence of guerrilla training camps in Panama has been rumored. Past attempts at guerrilla movements by local political aspirants have failed; for example, Pacora (in 1962) and Cerro Tute (in 1959).

It is unlikely that the Robles government would be overthrown during its negotiations with the United States over a settlement of the Panama Canal dispute, especially since reports have indicated that Panama would get most of what it asked. However, this is not to suggest that the president enjoys the backing of all political forces in the treaty talks. The administration has been jolted by the unfavorable reaction of politicians and the public to its negotiation effort and also to the joint statement of Presidents Robles and Johnson on September 24, 1965, explaining the treaty talks.

United States support for the Robles regime was manifested in the willingness of the former to enter into negotiations leading to a settlement of the long-standing dispute over the Canal. The December, 1964, announcement by the United States that it would abrogate the 1903 treaty was timed to deflate political pressures mounting against the fledgling Robles government. The September, 1965, "progress report" on the negotiations, issued simultaneously in Washington and Panama, was calculated to give Robles

³ Panama had three presidents in the first two weeks of 1955; Colonel Remón was assassinated and his successor, José Ramón Guizado, was forced out of office. Between 1948 and 1952 seven persons held the presidency for longer or shorter periods.

⁴ However, it has been claimed by the "losers" that the presidential elections of 1956 and 1964 were rigged in favor of the government candidate.

"added political advantage" with the "volatile" National Assembly.

According to Panamanian officials, the United States government was ready to authorize a budget support loan arranged in 1964. The extension of the loan, which had been contingent upon Panama's bringing its budget into balance in 1965, would require "forgiveness" on the part of the United States for Panama's failure to do so.

A rejection of the 1965 treaty by the National Assembly is conceivable. The unpopular Robles regime could then attempt to reopen the negotiations with the United States, hoping to gain more favorable terms for Panama regarding the present waterway. Assembly rejection of the projected treaty might delay the negotiation of a new basic document on the locks canal until after the holding of a presidential election. Hopefully, the next chief executive would enjoy a wide enough base of popular support to see a waterway pact ratified. Will the mounting pressures of world commerce for a sea-level facility wait for Panamanian politicians to stop bickering?

It is impossible to conceive of Panama recovering from the loss of the mainstay of its economy. Economic and political chaos would result if a sea-level route were located elsewhere. Panama offers two acceptable locations for the sea-level construction: the site of the present canal and another in Darién province, 110 miles east of the existing waterway. The former route has the disadvantage that the canal would have to be constructed by costly conventional methods. The Sasardi-Morti route in Darién would be less expensive to develop, for nuclear explosives could be employed. But, of course, development of the Darién route would turn the present terminal cities of Panama and Colón into "ghost towns."

The impact of a sea-level passage on the present economy, geared to the provision of goods and services for the operation and maintenance of the present waterway, could cause its collapse. The Republic of Panama could expect sizable grants-in-aid from the United States for the economic dislocations

caused by the conversion of the transisthmian route, but the United States government would not be willing to absorb the full impact of the isthmian crisis.

Construction of a new canal with the use of nuclear devices would contribute very little to relieve Panama's grave unemployment situation. Once completed, a force of no more than 500-1,000 workers would be required to operate and maintain a sea-level route in Panama. Some 15,000 jobs in the Canal Zone would disappear, as well as countless jobs in Panama that were dependent on satisfying the demands of the Canal Zone.

The United States has already warned the countries possessing feasible sea-level routes that the host nation could not anticipate the accrual of significant revenues from tolls on the water route. According to United States authorities, the amortization of a new canal would require 40-50 years. Also, the authorities indicated that the host nation would not be allowed to set tolls unilaterally. As the biggest user, the United States will insist that tolls be kept reasonable: not much higher than the present rates.

The switch to a sea-level canal would not be without political reverberations in Panama. It is unlikely that the ruling oligarchy could survive the dislocations accompanying the inauguration of a sea-level route.

Yet Panama would have to face still another problem regarding the new canal: its defense. How long would nationalistic sentiment, manifest on the Isthmus, allow foreign troops on Panamanian soil? It is clear that

(Continued on page 53)

Larry L. Pippin has also taught at the Universities of Nevada, Kansas, Wisconsin and Stanford. He has lived on the Isthmus of Panama for more than three years and returned to visit in July, 1965. He was at one time assistant editor of the *Hispanic American Report* and is the author of a book on Panamanian politics, *The Remón Era* (Stanford, Calif.: Institute of Hispanic American Affairs, 1964).

In the view of this observer, Costa Rica's history of "advances toward political, economic and social democracy" has been exceptional. Beyond that, he continues, "thanks to a new revolutionary spirit born of a civilian revolt in 1948, Costa Rica has intensified, in recent years, the beacon of achievement and hope that she represents in Central America."

Costa Rica: Mighty Midget

By C. HARVEY GARDINER

Research Professor of Latin American History, Southern Illinois University

ON ALL COUNTS—political, social and economic—tiny Costa Rica is that part of Central America in which the average citizen of the United States would feel most completely at home. Somewhat smaller than West Virginia, this southernmost of the original Central American states (Panama is a state apart in many respects) boasts narrow tropical coastal plains upon both the Caribbean and the Pacific. These plains flank a hinterland characterized by mountains, plateaus and intermountain valleys: this more temperate interior contains most of the 1,400,000 people and includes such leading cities as Cartago, Heredia, and the capital, San José. Socially the most homogeneous of all Central America, the Costa Rican population is approximately 97–98 per cent white, less than 1 per cent Indian, and about 2 per cent Negro.

Independence for Costa Rica, in 1821, resulted from rebellion against Spain in Mexico and in northern South America rather than from any direct Costa Rican or even Central American effort on the battlefield. Then, in 1838, after less than two decades of union with the remainder of Central America, Costa Rica emerged as a separate entity although

the issue of a reunited Central America has frequently inspired both positive and negative reaction in Costa Rica during the subsequent century and a quarter. By the late 1880's—and well ahead of her isthmian neighbors—Costa Rica exhibited a considerable measure of political maturity, reflected in meaningful suffrage, regular elections, peaceful transfers of political authority, and civilian dominance.

At the end of the nineteenth century banana cultivation introduced three new factors along the coast: Jamaican Negroes, United States capital, and plantation agriculture. Both before and since that time the national economy has pivoted basically on the many hardworking owners of small farms.

By the beginning of World War II, when long-continuing dictatorship characterized most of Central America—and complicated relations with Costa Rica's neighbors, especially Nicaragua—Costa Rican advances toward political, economic and social democracy were all the more exceptional. The disbandment of the national army was another step and this was not unrelated to the level of literacy which, at 80 per cent, is the highest in the region. With this beginning in history, and thanks to a new revolutionary spirit born of a civilian revolt in 1948, Costa Rica has intensified, in recent years, the beacon of achievement and hope that she represents in Central America.¹

¹ To mid-1962, the best account of contemporary Costa Rica in English is in Franklin D. Parker, *The Central American Republics* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1964), a work which places the isthmian state in its regional setting.

VOLCANO: PLAGUE AND PROFIT

When 11,260-foot high Irazú erupted violently on March 13, 1963, that volcano did more than anything else in recent years to focus world attention on Costa Rica. The succeeding months of continuous showers of ash from this peak, which is about fifteen air miles east of San José in a volcanic belt of the Cordillera Central, posed mounting problems for the inhabitants of the Central Plateau, the home of 75 per cent of the nation.

Like the volcanic ash, the economic losses soared: hundreds of thousands of coffee trees were damaged and Costa Rican capacity to earn foreign exchange was greatly reduced; one significant zone of tobacco production was entirely destroyed; and dairy production dropped almost one-third as the shortage of grass forced the slaughter of fine herds. In cities and towns, property damage and air pollution plagued the people. Roofs collapsed, clothing and household furnishings suffered damage, and the rising cost of such a service as street cleaning played havoc with government budgets. Unemployment soared. Roads were blocked and floods threatened. By the end of 1964, when the 21-month long eruptions abated—after tens of millions of tons of ash had been emitted from Irazú—the volcano-inspired damages approximated \$30,000,000, a sum that approached 6 per cent of the annual gross national product.

The small nation's battle against the fury of nature won aid of varying kinds from abroad. The International Red Cross, CARE and other agencies took action. Experts of many kinds—volcanologists, public health officers and others—rushed to Costa Rica. The Inter-American Development Bank authorized a grant of \$25,000 in technical assistance to study the effects of the eruptions on the economy, searching at the same time for means of economic rehabilitation. Food, clothing and medicines came from near and far, from neighboring Nicaragua and El Salvador and distant Canada and the U.S.

² One example of the extended coverage given Irazú is in Robert De Roos, "Costa Rica: Free of Volcano's Veil," *National Geographic*, Vol. 126, No. 1 (July, 1965), pp. 122-152.

From the United States went a detachment of Seabees to deepen the channel and to build dikes to minimize the threat of the Reventado River to the city of Cartago and environs. When the American servicemen departed, months later, they left their earth-movers for the Costa Ricans to use. Mechanical street-cleaning equipment was flown from the United States, especially to enable San José to cope with its ash problem. American corn and sorghum also were sent to Costa Rica, to sustain the hungry herds.

At the same time, United Nations action took several forms. A commission was appointed to investigate Costa Rican losses. When Costa Rica sought additional aid, Secretary-General U Thant set up a special fund to which member states could contribute. Some countries, among them Venezuela, Spain, Israel, West Germany and Nationalist China, quickly pledged monetary aid. A joint resolution sponsored by the Economic and Social Council drew additional attention to the plight and need of Costa Rica.

Meanwhile the Costa Rican government, after declaring a state of national emergency in December, 1963, had created a cabinet post to cope with the problems posed by the eruptions. Since December, 1964, the reduced volcanic activity has drawn less attention; full assessments of damage and recovery programs have been instituted; and rainfall has done wonders to restore stands of grass. Many, turning plague to profit, talk of the eventual enrichment of the soil by the volcanic ash. Even as Irazú focused foreign attention on Costa Rica, it also enabled the people of that land to develop a new dimension of national solidarity in the face of temporary disaster. Some, thinking of the focus of world attention, the stimulation of national unity and economic planning and much else, almost consider the eruption of Irazú a blessing in disguise.²

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Throughout the 1960's Costa Rican-United States relations have been keynoted by friendship and cooperation, in moments of both triumph and tragedy. The personal and

ideological appeal of John F. Kennedy won unusual popularity and support in literate and democratic Costa Rica. When President Kennedy, the first United States president to set foot on Central America, visited San José in March, 1963,³ to discuss regional economic integration with all the chief executives of Central America, the coincidence of liberal Costa Rican and liberal United States outlook was strengthened. Between the Kennedy trip and that of balding, bespectacled President Francisco Orlich (1962-1966) to Washington in mid-1964, the various kinds of aid that the United States had extended to the victims of Irazú had further cemented the bonds of cordiality between the two nations. And when President Orlich, the first Latin American chief executive to do so, visited President Lyndon Johnson, he was convinced of the continuity of United States outlook in reference to Cuba, communism in the Americas, the Alliance for Progress and the economic integration of Central America.

President Orlich's administration has manifested its anti-Castro, anti-Communist position on numerous occasions. Supporting, within a framework of free institutions, the idea and need of the "revolution of rising expectations" throughout Latin America, Costa Rica insists that Castro's propaganda and subversive activities be stopped. Within the O.A.S. Costa Rica buttressed this ideal by vigorously supporting the Venezuelan charges and case against Castro.⁴ Interested in eliminating, not simply curbing, Castro, Costa Rica has advocated the complete economic blockade of Cuba—a program which would have little direct effect on Costa Rica because historically the trade between the two states has been a mere trickle. And, when the O.A.S. turned to political matters, Costa Rica helped to originate the demand for the political blockade of Cuba which led

all of the remaining Latin American states with diplomatic missions in Havana, except Mexico, to break relations with Cuba. Although Costa Rica opposes unilateral military action against Cuba, its willingness to see force employed is evident in such moves as the granting of asylum to José Miró Cardona after that Cuban exile leader left the United States, and, more recently, in the rumored training of Cuban exiles in northeastern Costa Rica.

Early in 1964, when long-simmering differences over the Canal Zone disrupted United States-Panamanian relations, Costa Rican public opinion strongly supported Panama. At the same time, however, the government of Costa Rica offered to mediate the dispute, an offer which neither Panama nor the United States moved to accept. When the disputants broke diplomatic relations, Costa Rica played the custodial role for both countries, representing Panama in the United States, and the United States in Panama. This assist to diplomatic processes undoubtedly contributed to the resumption of the talks between the disputants which are still under way.

The twin traditions of civilian rule and meaningful elections have led Costa Rica routinely in late decades to oppose administrations that have come to power by means of military coups. A long, hard look at the administration of Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia in Guatemala preceded Costa Rican approval. A freeze beset Costa Rican-Dominican relations when President Juan Bosch, whose inauguration had been attended by the Costa Rican chief-of-state, was driven from office. On the other hand, no lingering questions attended the ouster of President João Goulart in Brazil. In all instances, these and others, Costa Rica has tried to distinguish between the *de facto* need for commercial relations and her right to indulge a *de jure* outlook politically. In every recent instance, Costa Rica has been forced, in time, to reconcile herself to political realities that contradict her ideals.

In the spring of 1965, when Costa Rica assigned a handful of police officials to the

³ For the Kennedy visit to Costa Rica, see *Hispanic American Report*, XVI No. 3 (May, 1963), pp. 244-45 and "J.F.K. in Costa Rica," *Life*, March 29, 1963, pp. 26-35.

⁴ See "The O.A.S. on Venezuela's Charges against Cuba," *Current History*, Vol. 58, No. 281 (January, 1965), pp. 40-44. The O.A.S. is the Organization of American States.

inter-American force in the Dominican Republic, the motives behind the move were possibly as numerous as the Costa Rican peace-keepers. The Costa Ricans were in the Dominican Republic for various reasons—among them, because they advocated peace, because they were anti-Castro and anti-Communist, because of some approval of the United States action, because they were pro-Bosch and hoped for his return, and because they wanted stability in the Caribbean zone.

Farther from home, Costa Rican diplomatic activity also reflects a persistent idealism: witness its treaty with Israel for the exchange of teachers and students; formal legislative support for Bolivia's demand for a corridor to the Pacific; and insistence at the United Nations upon international measures to insure human rights throughout the world. Whether the issue be major or minor, near or far, Costa Rican outlook is one of reality tempered by continuing optimism and lofty ideals.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET

Reluctantly and tardily Costa Rica has endorsed the idea of the regional economic integration of Central America.⁵ The productive effort that finally did something about the lethargic economic life of the isthmian region got under way in 1951 at the instigation of interested governments and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. However, seven years elapsed before the original blueprint, a multilateral treaty concerning free trade and economic integration, was signed by the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, in mid-1958. Then, for a half-decade, Costa Rica did nothing to

realize her professed interest in economic integration. The San José authorities not only refused to ratify the basic treaty, they also spurned the implementing agreements of 1958–1960.

Numerous factors helped to establish and perpetuate the stand-offish position of San José officialdom. Fearing the elimination of national tariffs, Costa Rica vaguely insisted that she would no longer be master of her industrial policies. Some questioned the brevity of the timetable of economic transition. Repeatedly advanced was the argument that Costa Rica's geographic position, as the southernmost of the five signatory states, was so disadvantageous that few benefits would accrue from membership in the treaty group. Because the nation's social welfare programs required considerable support, the government also feared that the loss of customhouse receipts would sabotage popular programs on the homefront. Countering the argument of most economists concerning the region—as to its interdependence—some Costa Ricans voiced the view that the Central American economies were frankly competitive, hence unable to become regionally cooperative. In addition to all else, Costa Rica remembered those things which set her apart from her neighbors: her higher literacy rate, her greater social homogeneity, her higher standard of living, her political stability, her more democratic system of landholding⁶—and concluded that the results of regional planning would not match those normally enjoyed by Costa Ricans.

Meanwhile, in June, 1959, the economic integration of her four neighbors to the north was launched. As a capstone to intermediate agreements, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua signed, in December, 1960, a general treaty intended to accelerate their economic union. Costa Rica ignored the negotiation and refused to sign the new treaty.

However, by 1963, Costa Rica, with a new political administration in power, had reversed herself. First of all, the presidential race of 1962—partially focused on this issue—gave victory to 56-year-old Orlich, an advo-

⁵ Costa Rica's relation to Central American unity is discussed in Parker, *op cit.*, pp. 83–89 and in James D. Cochrane, "Costa Rica, Panama, and Central American Economic Integration," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, VII, No. 3 (July, 1965), 331–344.

⁶ Land reform, not the explosive issue in Costa Rica that it is in many parts of Latin America, is discussed in George W. Hill, "The Agrarian Reform in Costa Rica," *Land Economics*, February, 1964, pp. 41–48.

cate of economic integration. Statistics related to the economic growth of the common market sector also induced some second thoughts in quarters that had previously inclined toward traditional economic outlook. The fact that a fund created by the members of the common market and the United States precluded the consideration of any projects in countries outside the market group also hastened the Costa Rican urge to join the fold. Concluding that membership in the regional effort was the lesser of the evils before her, Costa Rica coupled her own endorsement of Central American economic integration with an insistence that Panama also be brought within the program, thus eliminating much of the argument that Costa Rica was in a damaging peripheral position.

Shortly after the eruption of Irazú and the visit of President Kennedy—the latter bringing promise of additional United States endorsement of any regional planning—Costa Rica ratified the agreements that made her an active member of the Central American Common Market. However, from a statistical standpoint the interval since Costa Rica's involvement has been too short to reflect any economic miracles, and all the more so because of the unusual problems created by Irazú.

OTHER ECONOMIC MATTERS

For more than a decade Costa Rica has experienced an unfavorable balance of trade and much of her activity—in terms of domestic programs, regional economic integration, loans, investment, and world trade—stems from a desire to reverse that economic pendulum. Loans have come from a variety of sources and for a variety of purposes.

The Inter-American Development Bank, one of the most frequent lenders, has recently advanced loans for the following purposes: improvement of the electric power distribution system, credits for small businesses, feasibility studies in reference to the water and sewage problems of major towns, and for improvement and construction of farm-to-market roads to facilitate the flow of agricultural products and the more complete

integration of the national economy. Occasionally a loan, as that for the support and expansion of cooperatives, has been tendered with restrictive clauses which have led Costa Rican authorities to decline the funds. Alliance for Progress loans covering projects related to power plant and housing construction, water supply, agricultural development and highway construction have gone to Costa Rica through the Agency for International Development. AID also has advanced the funds with which Costa Rica hopes to complete, in 1966, that segment of the Inter-American Highway which at present is the biggest obstacle to automobile traffic between the United States and the Canal Zone. From the World Bank a sizable loan has been earmarked for the expansion of electric power and telephone facilities. The first loan by the International Finance Corporation to Costa Rica promises increased production of concrete products. A loan by the West German government is geared to the construction and improvement of new and old hospitals.

To lessen dependence upon coffee in the international market—West Germany currently takes about 60 per cent of Costa Rica's production—increased emphasis is being given other areas of commercial agriculture, sugar among them. Sugar cane production is getting under way in several undeveloped districts, in part because Costa Rica has the requisite soil and rainfall and in part because United States-Costa Rican friendship and United States-Cuban enmity suggest that the San José authorities may be able to win bigger quotas in the United States market. In somewhat similar manner, because of United States-Panamanian tensions, the planned expansion of the United Fruit Company in Panama may be redirected, at least partially, to Costa Rica's east coast, from which area the company had withdrawn a quarter of a century ago.

The pattern of recent foreign investment in Costa Rica also reveals present interests and future prospects. The General Tire Company, under an agreement on integrated industries for the region, has proposed establishing a factory there. A subsidiary of Al-

lied Chemical Corporation contracted to build Costa Rica's first oil refinery, at Limón, not long before Gulf Oil Corporation announced the suspension of its oil exploration there. And in addition, Alcoa is exploring the possibility of mining bauxite in Costa Rica.

In mid-1964—too recently to have produced results—the Costa Rican Economic Development Office was opened in New York City with one basic purpose: the preparation of market studies on investment opportunities in Costa Rica which might serve to lure United States capital. A recently issued 64-page handbook prepared by the ministry of industries places particular emphasis on the investment opportunities in food processing, forestry and wood products, metal working, selected agricultural crops, tourism, chemical and allied products, the cattle business, and fisheries.⁷

If the announced plan to establish three free trade zones at strategic points in eastern, central and western Costa Rica materializes and the program draws capital and industry, revolutionary changes may be in the offing for Costa Rica, both within the framework of the Central American Common Market and on the wider world scene.

INTERNAL POLITICS

The 4-year presidential term and the quiet transfer of authority have been almost unbroken traditions in Costa Rica for some 80 years, but a special surge of democratic will has appeared in post-World War II years. In the election of 1948, despite the fact that the voters favored Otilio Ulate over Rafael Calderón in a 5 to 4 ratio, Calderón's followers tried to annul the election. A brief revolt, led by José Figueres, an M.I.T.-trained coffee planter, defeated Calderón and assured Ulate his opportunity in the presidency. Figueres and his followers, meanwhile, had developed a set of principles: honest govern-

ment, liberty, advocacy of the civil service, programs of social and economic welfare, disbandment of the army, and the nationalization of the banks—ideas which soon spawned the new National Liberation Party (P.L.N.) In the presidential campaign of 1952–53 the popularity of Figueres, his party and program, led Calderón's Republican Party (P.R.) and Ulate's National Union Party (P.U.N.) to form a coalition. Figueres won, nevertheless, and his energetic and expensive administration of moderate outlook held power until 1958. Then a split within P.L.N., as two of its leaders sought the presidency, helped the eventual victory of Mario Echandi of the conservative P.U.N.

In 1962 the National Liberation Party reaffirmed its unity and its candidate, Francisco Orlich, defeated P.U.N.'s Otilio Ulate. Now, in the final year of President Orlich's term, Costa Rica is in the political dither that attends every president's fourth year in office. The administration's strength is in the field of foreign affairs: its position on Castro and communism has won favor; the visit of President Kennedy and President Orlich's formal visit to Washington have proven to be feathers in his political cap; and Costa Ricans have endorsed their government's attitude toward military coups in other lands. But economic matters have constituted an Achilles' heel for Orlich: his pension proposal for teachers; his plan to reduce Christmas bonuses of public employees; the adverse trade balance; the consequences attendant upon Irazú's eruptions;

(Continued on page 51)

⁷ Ministerio de Industrias, *Costa Rica: A Handbook of Facts for Persons Considering Investments* (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional, 1964). One of the latest glib-phrased invitations to the tourist is in Cy Cress, "Costa Rica," *Travel*, Vol. 124, No. 3 (September, 1965), 56–58, 60, 62.

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Making the point that the Dominican Republic throughout its history has been "afflicted with dictatorships, each of which has been linked to the next by a period of political instability, bordering on anarchy," this writer concludes that, "unless a strong and unifying leader should soon emerge," the chances are that history will again repeat itself.

Turmoil in the Dominican Republic

By HENRY WELLS

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EVER SINCE ITS FOUNDING in 1844 the Dominican Republic has been afflicted with dictatorships, each of which has been linked to the next by a period of political instability bordering on anarchy. The most brutal and absolute despotisms were those of Ulises Heureaux (1882-1899) and Rafael L. Trujillo (1930-1961), both of which came to an end with the assassination of the tyrant. And, in some respects, the turmoil that has plagued the ill-starred republic since the Trujillo assassination is reminiscent of the turbulence that followed the demise of Heureaux.

In both instances the death of the dictator gave rise to bitter struggles among rival aspirants to power. In both instances, also, those who gained control of the state remained at the helm only briefly. Between 1899 and 1906 the presidency changed hands six times, once by election and five times by revolution. In the post-Trujillo period the rate of turnover has been somewhat higher. Between May 30, 1961, the date of the Trujillo assassination, and September 3, 1965, when Hector García-Godoy was installed as provisional president, the highest office of the Republic

changed hands no less than seven times. (This figure, incidentally, does not include the naming of "presidents" by the rival camps during the four-month civil war of mid-1965.) As in the earlier post-Heureaux period, only one of the post-Trujillo presidents gained office by election.

These parallels are instructive because they call attention to certain constants in the two widely separated post-dictatorship situations—common factors that help explain the more recent course of events. These common legacies may be summarized as follows: (1) an atmosphere of suspicion, intrigue, betrayal, and corruption; (2) a widespread reliance on violence to attain political ends; (3) a near-absence of men able and willing to provide constructive national leadership, and (4) a large, illiterate, poverty-stricken mass of rural inhabitants completely outside the mainstream of national life.¹

In such circumstances as these, it is not surprising that the Republic has had difficulty getting on its feet since 1961. But the fact of its social malaise does not explain why specific attempts to govern the country have failed, why the politically active sectors of the population have become polarized at opposite ends of the political spectrum, nor does it shed much light on what the prospects are for eventual stability and cohesion. For answers to such questions as these, we must

¹ As late as 1960, only 12.2 per cent of the Dominican people lived in cities of more than 20,000 population. See Bruce M. Russett, et al., *Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 52.

examine the forces and personalities involved in the events that have occurred so far.

Prior to the revolt of April 24, 1965, four different groups had dominated the Dominican political scene for at least several months each. Their respective tenures therefore constitute periods into which the first four years of the post-Trujillo era may conveniently be divided. The first, which we may call the period of Trujillo's heirs, began with the assassination and lasted until mid-January, 1962. The second period, dominated by the Council of State, began with its inauguration on January 18, 1962, and ended with the inauguration of Juan Bosch as president on February 27, 1963. The following seven months constitute the third period, that of the Bosch government. The fourth period, when the Republic was ruled by a Triumvirate, lasted from the overthrow of Bosch on September 25, 1963, until the April, 1965, revolt.

As each of the four periods advanced, the group that had been dominant at the start became progressively less able to maintain control. Eventually it had to step down and watch the next group go through the same progression. This pattern changed at the end of the fourth period, however, when the downfall of the until-then-dominant group, the Triumvirate, led not to the rise of yet another set of rulers but to the outbreak of civil war. Thus began the present or fifth period.

TRUJILLO'S HEIRS

President of the Republic at the time of the assassination was Joaquín Balaguer, formerly a professor of law at the University of Santo Domingo. An enigmatic figure, Balaguer had been intimately associated with the dictatorship as one of Trujillo's closest advisers and most trusted administrators, but he had nonetheless somehow managed to preserve a reputation for integrity and independence. Alone among those within the tyrant's inner circle, he was thought not to have used his position to enrich himself. A quiet, soft-spoken, scholarly looking little man, he avoided the limelight; but in his occasional

public speeches he displayed great oratorical effectiveness.

Within a few weeks after Trujillo's death, Balaguer started to introduce liberal reforms. Curbs on freedom of expression were gradually relaxed. Some of the more notorious blackguards of the former regime were removed from power, and the dreaded security police were transferred from military to civil control. Political parties were allowed to organize and preparations for the holding of free elections the following May were set in motion. Balaguer seems to have recognized that the Trujillo system of personal autocracy could not survive its founder and that his own continuance in office depended on a democratizing of the new regime. He may also have had in mind the economic and diplomatic sanctions which the Organization of American States had imposed on the Republic the preceding August, when the O.A.S. decided that Trujillo's part in the attempted assassination of President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela on June 24, 1960, had made the Dominican Republic "a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere." Balaguer doubtless hoped that the inauguration of a democratization policy would induce the O.A.S. to lift its sanctions, which had already severely damaged the Dominican economy.

Like calculations may have motivated the support given to the Balaguer reforms by the former dictator's 32-year-old son, "Ramfis" (Lt. Gen. Rafael L. Trujillo, Jr.), who had assumed the post of chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his return to the Dominican Republic two days after his father's death. Since the Trujillo family holdings were almost co-extensive with the national economy, it was decidedly to the Trujillos' interest that the sanctions be lifted as soon as possible. In any case Ramfis did not attempt to assume dictatorial powers but instead served as a buffer between Balaguer and *Trujillista* extremists who disliked the reforms. However, when two of the latter, brothers of the slain dictator, returned from exile on November 15, 1961, with the apparent purpose of staging a coup d'état, Ramfis resigned his post and fled the country. And, four days later, a

warning from the Dominican air force and a timely show of force by the United States navy caused the "wicked uncles" also to depart. The rest of the family soon followed them into exile, whereupon the government confiscated all Trujillo properties and possessions.

Since September the main opposition group, the National Civic Union (U.C.N.), had been demanding the expulsion of the Trujillos as a precondition of U.C.N. participation in a coalition government. Once the Trujillos had gone, the U.C.N. turned its fire on Balaguer and tried to force his resignation by staging an eleven-day general strike. When that effort failed, the U.C.N. acquiesced to a Balaguer proposal whereby the existing government would be replaced by a Council of State, to consist of Balaguer as president and six others—the six others being members of the U.C.N. or acceptable to it. The Council took office on January 1, 1962, and three days later the O.A.S. revoked its economic and diplomatic sanctions. On January 16, however, the Council was overthrown by a military coup directed by the secretary of state for the armed forces, Major General Pedro Rodríguez Echavarría, a Balaguer appointee. Two days later another group of military officers arrested Rodríguez Echavarría and restored to power all members of the Council of State except Balaguer, last of the Trujillo heirs, who soon retreated into exile.

COUNCIL OF STATE

During its thirteen months in power the reconstituted Council of State tried fairly successfully to reactivate the economy, which had been brought almost to a standstill by the O.A.S. sanctions and the post-assassination turmoil. Being only a transitional regime, the Council left the question of major reforms to the government that would succeed it after the scheduled general election of December 20, 1962. Much of its attention had to be given to preparations for that election and to keeping order during the long and often tumultuous political campaign.

At least four of the councillors were U.C.N.

members or sympathizers. All seven (including the new president of the Council and of the Republic, Rafael F. Bonnelly) belonged to the upper-middle or upper class of Dominican society. In their moderate-conservative views, as well as in their social background, they were typical of the top leadership of the U.C.N., an anti-*Trujillista* movement that well-to-do business and professional men had organized soon after the assassination. Although many of the U.C.N. leaders had served the dictatorship in one capacity or another (Bonnelly, for example, had headed the ministries of interior, labor, justice, and education), they had never accepted the Trujillos as their social equals. The founder of the U.C.N. and later its candidate for president, Viriato A. Fiallo, was one of the few who never collaborated with Trujillo in any way and in fact, had suffered imprisonment for resistance to the regime. In general, they belonged to the traditional ruling class and, partly because of the patronage at the Council's disposal, they confidently expected to win the election.

By mid-summer, 1962, however, it had become obvious that Juan Bosch, founder and presidential candidate of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (P.R.D.), would be a strong contender. He was gaining a sizable following among the rural and urban poor through his twice-daily radio broadcasts from Santo Domingo and through the activities of his party organizers in the countryside and in the city slums. Whereas Fiallo had turned out to be an inept politician and a bumbling speaker with little to say besides anti-Trujillo platitudes, Bosch was showing himself to be a shrewd campaign strategist and a master of populist oratory. Speaking in the accent and vocabulary of the country people, he instructed them in their political rights and promised them land, education, and a higher standard of living.

Bosch addressed his appeals exclusively to the poor and the colored. His carefully cultivated reputation for being sympathetic toward *los negritos* and his none-too-subtle insinuations that Fiallo thought himself superior to them (a process of character black-

ening that Fiallo made all the more effective by his clumsy attempts to defend himself) were important factors in the campaign. So also were Bosch's increasingly scathing attacks on the more privileged classes, with whom he always identified the candidates of the U.C.N. Calling them *tutumpotes*, a smear word roughly translated as "fat cats," he stirred up class and race hatreds that had not previously existed. Himself a man of humble origins and little formal education, Bosch had never outgrown his adolescent bitterness against the educated classes of his homeland, despite his having become internationally known as a writer and intellectual during his twenty-four years in exile.

On two occasions toward the end of the campaign his behavior suggested a certain ambivalence toward power—as if he were both covetous of power and afraid of it. By that time, a decisive victory for the P.R.D. seemed almost certain; but Bosch seized upon two minor incidents, manufactured them into crises and, during each, announced his withdrawal from the presidential race. (The first incident, occurring on November 22, was the announcement of a Central Election Board decision which Bosch thought was unfavorable to the P.R.D. concerning the color of the paper on which the ballots would be printed. The second was the accusation by an obscure priest that Bosch was a Marxist-Leninist.) Although Bosch turned both incidents to his own advantage (the board reversed itself and the priest withdrew his charge), his over-reaction to routine annoyances suggested a latent desire to escape from the impending task of having to govern the nation.

That responsibility nevertheless became unequivocally his. Bosch won a landslide victory in an incontestably fair and free election.² The 628,000 votes that he received were 60 per cent of the 1,055,000 cast and twice as many as the number gained by Fiallo, his nearest competitor. Three minor party candidates shared the remaining 10 per cent. P.R.D. candidates also won 22 of the 27 seats in the senate and 49 of the 74 seats in

the chamber of deputies, as compared with 4 and 20, respectively, won by U.C.N. candidates.

The leaders of the U.C.N., as well as their supporters on the Council of State and in the government, were stunned and depressed by the outcome. They had not really expected to lose the election, and they found it difficult to accept the implications of their defeat. Most difficult to swallow was the notion that family and wealth would thenceforth be treated not with deference but with hostility. Under the Trujillo regime, even though it had been distasteful to some of them, they had at least had the satisfaction of being given assignments befitting their own conception of their proper role. All this seemed threatened if not destroyed by the Bosch victory.

THE BOSCH GOVERNMENT

The apprehensions of the old élite doubtless derived both from an anticipated loss of power and prestige and from fears of economic ruin. If so, the latter would seem to have been exaggerated, for the P.R.D. program of social and economic reform was not, in fact, very radical. If it had been implemented, all classes of Dominican society would probably have reaped substantial benefits.

The P.R.D. proposals for land reform, improvements in agriculture, tax incentives to industrialization, promotion of tourism, minimum-wage and social-security legislation, housing, education, and the rest, were indeed moderate, sensible, and long overdue. They were precisely what the Alliance for Progress called for and the Kennedy administration was prepared to back Bosch to the fullest extent in order that the program might be carried out. Some \$46 million in AID funds were available to the Republic, and over 300 American experts and Peace Corpsmen were sent in to provide technical assistance of various kinds.

Since there were no longer large landowners to be threatened with expropriation nor any great concentrations of wealth to be broken up, the program of the Bosch government was

² See Henry Wells, "The OAS and the Dominican Elections," *Orbis*, Spring, 1963, pp. 150-163.

not "socialistic." Large-scale nationalization had already been accomplished when the Balaguer government took title to the vast Trujillo holdings—plantations, mines, industries, and businesses of all kinds. A more vexing problem, indeed, was what to do with the 38 ex-Trujillo business enterprises that were now state-owned. Nor was the Bosch government committed to a policy of fiscal unorthodoxy. On the contrary, its austerity program of public spending and import controls would have satisfied any conservative banker.

Thus, the short life of the Bosch regime can scarcely be attributed to right-wing opposition to any frontal attack on the economic status quo by the regime, for no such attack was ever mounted. Even the moderate reform program never got under way. One reason for this was Bosch's inadequacy as an administrator. As Harold D. Lasswell once said of agitators in general, a characterization to which Bosch almost exactly conforms, "They become frustrated and confused in the tangled mass of technical detail upon which successful administration depends."³ Bosch could neither delegate authority nor effectively dispose of the matters that he insisted on dealing with personally.

A related reason was the shortage of administrative talent. Being the kind of leader he was, Bosch did not surround himself with men of outstanding ability and experience. His ablest lieutenant, Angel Micolán, had the practical skills of a party organizer but lacked qualifications for high public office. Since the Dominican government had no merit system, the P.R.D. victory meant that thousands of government jobs were given to the party faithful, all but a few of whom were ill-qualified to hold them. Even outside the P.R.D. there were few Dominicans with the technical or professional training required for implementing Bosch's program. Those having such training were for the most part not available since his bitter attacks on the *tutumpotes* had so alienated them that they

would have nothing to do with his administration.

It is here that we begin to see the reasons for Bosch's overthrow. Bosch was incapable of pursuing a policy of national reconciliation. The fears and hatreds that he had stirred up continued to divide the nation, and he did little or nothing to reduce them. On the contrary, the steamroller tactics that he used in securing the passage of controversial legislation and the adoption of a new constitution frustrated the opposition and exacerbated their hostility toward the regime.

Much more important, however, was Bosch's policy toward Communists. Being a strong believer in freedom of expression, association and movement as inviolable rights, Bosch tended to find restrictions against Communist activity as repugnant as communism itself. As a consequence he permitted the return of Communist leaders who had been exiled by earlier governments. He also did not interfere with the rising volume of propaganda published and broadcast by the three main Communist groups—the pro-Castro 14th of June Movement, the pro-Peking Dominican Popular Movement, and the pro-Moscow Popular Socialist Party.

This permissive attitude disturbed the leaders of the U.C.N. and other conservative groups, who became increasingly alarmed by the fact that Bosch did not appear to pay any attention to their charges that Communists were infiltrating his government. Whether self-induced or justified by the situation, a kind of collective panic overtook the conservative elements in August and September of 1963. Thousands participated in Sunday protest marches organized by a group called the Christian Anti-Communist Movement, and many business establishments closed their doors in a merchants' protest strike on September 20. In the end, however, it was a militantly anti-Communist group in the armed forces that overthrew the Bosch government on September 25. And, apart from scattered demonstrations staged by teenage supporters of the 14th of June Movement, scarcely a voice was raised in defense of Bosch, even within the P.R.D.

³Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York: Viking Press [Compass Book], 1960), p. 79.

THE TRIUMVIRATE

Leader of the coup was Colonel (later General) Elías Wessin y Wessin, then head of the air force training school. A devout Catholic and a straight-laced career officer, nevertheless Wessin did not impose outright military control. Three civilians were quickly installed as a provisional government to rule the country until elections could be held.

First head of the Triumvirate was Emilio de los Santos, a 65-year-old lawyer who had served as president of the Central Election Board during the 1962 campaign and election. On his resignation in December, 1963, the other members of the Triumvirate appointed its secretary of state for foreign affairs, Donald Reid Cabral, to the vacancy. A former vice president of the Council of State, Reid Cabral served as president of the Triumvirate and of the Republic until overthrown in the revolt of April, 1965.

Although experienced in public affairs, Reid was not a strong executive. His boyish appearance and colorless personality were decided handicaps in a country whose long tradition of rule by heavy-handed *caudillos* and bemedaled dictators had accustomed the populace to expect forceful leadership on the part of its presidents. Although the Reid government distributed some 1,500 parcels of former Trujillo land to the peasants (as compared with only 300 distributed by the Bosch regime), it failed to win any popular support. Under its austerity program, continued from the Bosch period, the economy continued to languish, and unemployment exceeded 30 per cent of the labor force. Moreover, corruption within the armed forces and the police reached scandalous proportions. Officers made fortunes for themselves by using military ships and planes to import contraband whiskey, cigarettes, food-stuffs, radios, television sets, refrigerators, and even automobiles, for sale on the black market and in the duty-free military canteens. Reid's belated efforts to stop the illicit traffic by demoting or dismissing the worst offenders and by closing the canteens may have contributed to his downfall, for

these actions aroused hostility against him within the armed forces, and particularly in the army. The revolt, in which young army officers played a prominent part, began on April 24, 1965, and the government resigned the following day.

THE REVOLT AND CIVIL WAR

The announced purpose of the officers and civilians who conspired to overthrow the Triumvirate was to restore Juan Bosch to the presidency and reinstate the "Bosch" constitution of 1963, which the Triumvirate had abrogated. The rebels therefore called themselves the "Constitutional" forces. On April 25, pending Bosch's expected return from exile in Puerto Rico, they installed José Molina Ureña, who had been president of the chamber of deputies during the Bosch regime, as acting president.

The revolt turned into civil war the next day, when General Wessin, leader of military elements opposed to the return of Bosch, ordered Dominican air force planes to strafe and bomb the National Palace and other points in Santo Domingo held by the rebels. The latter had in the meantime taken thousands of rifles, machine guns, and other arms from the military arsenals and distributed them to residents of the Santo Domingo slums. This incident, more than any other, determined the course of the next few days. For the armed civilians turned into a wildly shooting, burning, pillaging mob, on numerous occasions incited by trained Communist leaders to acts of wanton brutality and destructiveness. Completely beyond the control of the police or even the original rebel leadership, the insurgents converted the civil war temporarily into anarchy.

It was at this juncture (on April 28) that President Lyndon Johnson decided to send in the United States marines. Controversial though the action was, it unquestionably saved thousands of lives. It not only permitted the safe evacuation of some 2,000 American citizens and nationals of other countries but also sharply reduced the fratricidal strife among the Dominicans themselves. By eventually confining the rebel

forces to one part of the capital and acting as a buffer between them and the Wessin forces, the American troops (joined late in May by military units from four of the Latin American countries, to form the O.A.S.-sponsored Inter-American Peace Force⁴) maintained an uneasy, often ruptured stalemate—a stalemate during which efforts to mediate the conflict could proceed.

On May 4 the "Constitutional" forces named Colonel Francisco Caamaño "president" to replace Molina, who had taken asylum in the Colombian embassy some days before. On May 7 the opposing forces chose General Antonio Imbert, a former member of the Council of State and one of the two surviving assassins of Trujillo, to head what they called the "Government of National Reconstruction." Meanwhile both sides made clear their resentment of the presence of American troops, each claiming that its imminent victory over the other had been blocked by the United States intervention.

The failure of President Johnson's special assistant McGeorge Bundy's ten-day attempt in May to negotiate a settlement made it clear that the hostility of both sides toward the United States precluded unilateral mediation of the conflict. The task of bringing the two camps into agreement on a provisional government therefore devolved upon the O.A.S. On June 2 the O.A.S. appointed a three-man mediation committee, one member of which was Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker of the United States. After three months of laborious and often frustrating negotiations with both Caamaño and Imbert and their respective aides, Bunker and his Brazilian and Salvadorian colleagues evolved an Act of Dominican Reconciliation and an Institutional Act, on which both sides could finally agree. Signed on August 31, 1965, the two documents brought the civil war at least officially to an end and established a provisional government to rule the country until superseded by a duly elected president and congress in 1966.

⁴ For the text of the O.A.S. resolution establishing this peace force, see *Current Documents* in this issue, page 50.


The Institutional Act requires that general elections be held not sooner than six months and not later than nine months after its effective date. This means that they must be held sometime between March 1 and May 30, 1966. They will in all probability be scheduled for a date in May—if the provisional government lasts that long.

If the elections are to be free, honest, and peaceful, and if their results are to be accepted without reservation by winners and losers alike, the passions and tensions that divided the politically active elements in the Dominican Republic so bitterly during the civil war will have to have subsided more rapidly than now seems possible—no matter how hard President García-Godoy tries to conciliate the two sides and unify the nation. Although the first two months of his presidency showed some reduction in tension and some revival of the paralyzed economy, the political atmosphere continued to be charged with hatred, suspicion, and intrigue. Rightist elements saw evidence of Communist infiltration of the Godoy government, whereas leftist elements saw in the continued existence of the armed forces (despite the exiling of General Wessin) evidence of a balance of power decidedly unfavorable to them. Both sides continued to abominate the Inter-American Peace Force, yet its presence continued to be necessary to protect each from the reprisals of the other.

Both the short-run and the long-run prospects for peace, stability, and cohesion in the Dominican Republic are at best unpromising. Unless a strong and unifying leader should soon emerge (itself a most unlikely prospect), the chances are that new conflicts will break out and a dictatorship of the Right or the Left will be imposed.

Henry Wells is a specialist on Latin American elections. From August, 1961, through December, 1962, he served on an O.A.S. technical assistance mission to the Dominican Republic and, in 1963, he served on a similar mission to Honduras. He has published numerous articles on Latin American politics.

A horizontal scale bar labeled "Scale of Miles" with markings at 0, 50, 100, 200, and 300.



Although this observer believes that "it will take a long time . . . for Honduras to become 'modern' in the sense the writers now use this term, no matter who governs and no matter what policies are selected and implemented," he also makes clear his belief in the capability of the Honduran leaders "to analyze, compare and initiate the ideas which best fit the circumstances of their own environment."

Honduras: Problems and Prospects

By WILLIAM S. STOKES

Senior Professor of Comparative Political Institutions, Claremont Men's College

IN AN ERA which stresses the evolutionary progression of states (traditional, transitional, modern) and offers the exciting prospect of achieving "take-off" into sustained economic growth, it is logical and understandable that Honduran leaders should experiment with at least some of the theories as to how to get a country moving. This Honduras has done, especially during the administration of President José Ramón Villeda Morales (1957-1963) but with results which have sometimes been the reverse of expectations (*contraproducente*).

It should, of course, be made crystal clear at the outset that Honduras combines some of the characteristics of all of the stages of growth as defined by the authors who use such terms as traditional, transitional, and modern. Honduras has never been a land of great material affluence. It has, however, produced men of such achievement as to honor the most advanced of the "modern" states. Francisco Morazán, the greatest of the country's national heroes, José Cecilio del Valle, a profound intellect and brilliant writer, Alberto Membreño, author of *Hondureñismos* and other works, Rómulo E. Durón, eminent historian, Policarpo Bonilla, who espoused principles of classical liberalism, Luis Andrés Zuñiga, author of the magnificent *Fábulas*, Rafael Heliodoro Valle, Marcos

Carías Reyes, Juan Ramón Molina and many others immediately come to mind.

The members of the upper-middle classes are as talented, educated, traveled, and cultured as those of any of the states in the Western Hemisphere, and Honduras has achieved what some other nations have so far found beyond realization—a cultural environment almost entirely free of racial bias, prejudice, or discrimination (ethnic makeup, 1950 census: mestizos, 91 per cent; Indians, 6 per cent; Negroes, 2 per cent; whites, 1 per cent).

There is little or no population pressure on land and liberal agrarian laws going back to 1829 make it not only possible but easy for every Honduran to be a land-owner. As much as a third of the entire territory of Honduras may be included in the Mosquitia, which is largely unexplored and which probably will remain a frontier for Hondurans to exploit for many years. About 80 per cent of Honduras is mountainous and forested. There is much fertile land, the climate is salubrious and perhaps equal to the best on our planet, and the people have always found it relatively easy to provide themselves with food, clothing, and at least rudimentary shelter.

Having said these things, one must then deal with the demonstrable fact that productivity in most fields in Honduras is low and

that hence the standard of living for the entire population does not correspond to that of some other states. The Honduran governments of recent times have taken note of this problem and have proclaimed their dedication to a program of change which would result in an improvement for everyone, but especially for the lower classes. Since the views I expressed as to the nature of this problem in 1962¹ seem to be supported by the evidence which the intervening years have produced, in this present essay I shall attempt to focus on those events and episodes which most clearly illustrate the general principles involved.

DEDICATION TO DEVELOPMENT

The election of Dr. José Ramón Villeda Morales to the presidency in 1957—and the Liberal party to leadership for the first time in 25 years—brought to power a non-Communist democratic government of the socialist left which was dedicated to rapid economic development through application of the principles of “modern” economics. Many of the men around President Villeda Morales believed that economic planning was superior to the market mechanism or price system as a means of allocating resources. They desired to see government produce and distribute goods and services wherever possible and to regulate private enterprise in those areas in which the government itself could not operate. They often equated profit with exploitation, and they viewed foreign investment, especially that of the United States, with suspicion and even hostility.

Some leaders of the Liberal party hoped that the time had now come when it would be possible to expropriate the properties of the United Fruit Company. However, such a policy lacked feasibility. The United Fruit Company produced bananas on a narrow strip of land on the hot, tropical north coast, land which had been reclaimed from swamp and rain forest and which was not suitable for diversified commercial exploitation. If

the government were to seize the properties, what would it have? It would have the land and plant, but also the immediate problem of the actual production of the bananas, or some other crop, to obtain the needed foreign exchange. The problems involved in this production are technical and many. For one, it is doubtful that the technicians needed for such work could be found in sufficient numbers in Honduras, or attracted from outside, to work for a government-owned enterprise. In addition, labor costs would be high since, in order to attract workers from the pleasant highlands of the interior, the United Fruit Company had always been compelled to pay the highest wages, provide the best conditions of employment and the most desirable benefits, such as education, health care, and recreational facilities, in the entire country. Further, the production of the bananas represents only one phase of an intricate process. Any government enterprise would have to be prepared to transport the bananas in specially designed ships, establish distribution networks in the United States and European markets, and constantly advertise the banana as an acceptable or even superior product to competitive fruits.

Although the Liberals made no effort to seize the properties of the United Fruit Company, they did attempt to revise the terms and conditions of operation in a manner more suitable to their views and ideology. In 1962, the government put into effect a new agrarian law which permitted it to impose heavy taxation on uncultivated land, expropriate private property under certain circumstances, and plan agricultural diversification. The Villeda Morales government had also initiated a worker-oriented Labor Code in 1959 which, combined with the land expropriation provisions of the 1962 agrarian law, led to some question as to whether the fruit companies would choose to continue operations in Honduras. For, while natural distress in the form of blowdowns had aggravated the situation, the reduced banana production over the recent years partly reflected the companies' dissatisfaction with the policies of the government.

¹ See “Honduras: Dilemma of Development,” in the February, 1962, issue of *Current History*.

President Villeda Morales' advisers evidently believed that the banana companies would continue to produce as before—providing the government with the revenues which it had enjoyed and which it desired to continue to enjoy in the future—and at the same time accept the more costly terms and the more difficult conditions. The possibility that this attitude was erroneous persuaded the congress to modify the Labor Code and the agrarian law in 1963 in such a way as not to further discourage the American banana companies from producing bananas. The United Fruit Company responded by inaugurating a \$15 million investment program for a five-year banana development project and, by 1965, the United Fruit Company and associated producers had about 30,000 acres of bananas under cultivation.

The new labor code of 1959 provided for increases in welfare benefits for Hondurans, such as full pay during illness up to eight months, severance pay on similar terms, ten weeks at full pay for pregnant women workers, and employer-supported nurseries. The government entered the development field through President Villeda Morales' four-year program, "Forward toward Progress," with financing expected to come from internal sources, foreign loans, and the Alliance for Progress. The new Constitution of 1957 permitted increased governmental centralization, regulation of the economy, and welfare benefits for the masses. The government took advantage of such provisions to engage in planning, heavy public expenditures, and deficit financing. By 1962 service on the national debt took 10.9 per cent of the entire budget.

There was no question but that President Villeda Morales, his closest advisers in the executive branch, and the leaders of the Liberal party in Congress all desired, even passionately, to achieve a high rate of economic development as a result of their policies. What, however, were the consequences of their actions? They were dismayed to discover that Honduras began to experience a flight of local capital, lack of interest on the part of foreigners to invest, unemployment, and rising prices. Whereas the goal of the Alliance

for Progress was a minimum per capita increase in economic growth of 2.5 per cent per year; the rate in Honduras was about 0.6 per cent. How scarce a commodity is human talent and ability and how great a tragedy it is for a developing country to lose a single qualified doctor, surgeon, engineer, agronomist, inventor, businessman or any skilled person engaged in the production and distribution of goods and services. Yet, the policies of the Villeda Morales government had the overall effect of discouraging the best educated and most highly qualified citizens in the country from working to their capacity. Many reduced production, gave up expansion plans, went on long vacations, removed their capital to foreign countries, or left their native land for more pleasant and rewarding locations in Latin America, the United States, or Western Europe.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Now let us turn to political problems. Although Honduras broke relations with Castro on April 24, 1961, and President Villeda Morales declared on September 18, 1962, in Tegucigalpa that Castroism was a cancer which must be removed from the Western Hemisphere as soon as possible by whatever means necessary, a major problem was the failure of the Villeda Morales administration to curb the extreme leftism sometimes led by Castro subversives.

A number of well-known and powerful Liberals directly or indirectly advanced the cause of leftist extremism. Among such men one can include, from their statements and actions, Congressmen Miguel Rafael Muñoz and Ildefonso Orellana Bueso. Orellana Bueso was head of the Liberal party council in San Pedro Sula and was strongly supported by the left-wing students and academicians in Tegucigalpa. Many turned to the foreign minister, Alvarado Puerto, for leadership. In the executive branch most of the left-wingers were to be found in the middle echelons. Other officials who tended to support Castro or his policies or both from time to time included: Francisco ("Indio") Sánchez in the ministry of foreign affairs;

Ubodoro Arriaga in the official development bank; Filander Díaz Chávez, director of the housing institute; Manuel Antonio Santos, director of secondary education; Francisco Milla Bermúdez, head of the Honduran delegation to the United Nations; and Juan Bermúdez Milla, the minister of public works.

In mid-1959, the armed forces lost control over the police, which became the Civil Guard. This development resulted from strong leftist antimilitary attacks. It was widely believed that the Civil Guard had become the political arm of the Liberal party and would be used to effect an *imposición* (rigged election) in the coming presidential campaign. The armed forces (my estimates: army, 3,500; Civil Guard, 2,500; air force, 400) had been compelled in recent years to deal with guerrilla bands in the country and, in 1963, a group of Communist-oriented unions on the north coast succeeded in establishing a national labor federation, the National Federation of Workers and Peasants of Honduras (membership about 5,800), the officials of which were Communists or Communist sympathizers. Meanwhile, Castro endeavored to make Honduras and Guatemala focal areas for penetration of Central America and achieved a degree of success in Honduras prior to the ousting of Villeda Morales and his Liberal administration on October 3, 1963.

MILITARY COUP

General elections were scheduled in Honduras for October 13, 1963, but on October 3 Air Force Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano led a military coup that deposed the government of President Villeda Morales. Colonel López Arellano declared himself chief-of-state on October 4, dissolved the legislature and declared that he would govern by decree until a constitutional government could be established. The reasons he gave for the coup were, "to abolish the politically oriented Civil Guard and establish an apolitical force to fight Communist infiltration in government which was threatening our democracy and religious heritage."

The provisional government made strong

efforts in 1964 to thwart Communist infiltration and guerrilla activities while preparing for elections. The government amended the 1934 electoral law to deny participation to subversive political groups, and in order to reduce the number of splinter parties, legality was extended only to those with 15,000 or more members. All citizens and aliens were required to revalidate their identity cards in order to guarantee honest elections and deny participation by subversives. About 200-300 political prisoners were held during 1964, although Colonel López Arellano announced an amnesty on November 18 for all persons convicted of political offenses after December 9, 1957, excepting Communists. Sporadic guerrilla attacks were contained.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The elections which had been promised were held on February 16, 1965. Voters elected a constituent assembly of 64 members which had the task of drafting a new constitution and naming a president. The Nationalist party, led by Colonel López Arellano, won 35 seats to 29 for the Liberal party, led by former President Ramón Villeda Morales. The elections in the two largest cities, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, were clearly without fraud, but the Liberal party claimed that irregularities had taken place in the rural areas. When the assembly convened on March 15, it elected Colonel López Arellano president for a six-year term.

As a provisional government, the regime of Colonel López Arellano reversed many of the policies of the previous administration and in particular expressed confidence in private initiative and enterprise. In part for this reason but also because Honduras began to reap the benefits of the Central American Common Market (C.A.C.M.), 1963 was a very good year and 1964 was even better (GNP about \$368 million or 6.5 per cent above 1963). There was a 3.5 per cent per capita increase, and official forecasts predicted about a 5 per cent increase in GNP for 1965.

Immediately following the 1965 elections and the establishment of the new constitu-

tional government, President López Arellano embarked upon an ambitious four-year development plan in which both foreign and domestic private enterprise were invited to share. In October, the minister of economy declared that, "Foreign and domestic capital investment will be effectively protected and private industry will enjoy all of the incentives that the state can offer." However, just as the economic policies of the Villeda Morales administration had the effect of discouraging some Hondurans with talent and ability from remaining in the country and producing, so the victory of López Arellano has resulted in the voluntary exile of a number of the educated, talented, and wealthy members of the Liberal party. Upon achieving victory in the constituent assembly, President López Arellano sought to conciliate the defeated Liberals by offering them positions in the government, but the leaders rejected his gestures of friendship and a number of them left the country. Thus again, a small, developing country is denied both the political and economic contributions of people it can ill afford to lose, at least for the time being.

THE ROLE OF THE U.S.

What is the response of the United States to the social, economic, and political problems of Honduras? The United States posture is reflected, in a general way, in the following official State Department policy statement: "The United States wants to maintain cordial relations with Honduras as a partner in the Western Hemisphere and in the community of free nations. It also wishes to cooperate with Honduras to strengthen the bases for economic and social development and responsible representative government." It might be said in passing that the United States Department of State appreciated the Honduras contribution of a contingent of 250 troops to the O.A.S. Peace Force in the Dominican Republic in mid-1965.

The United States has contributed many millions of dollars in foreign aid to Honduras over the years. The Agency for International Development (AID) has summarized its recent purpose and program in Honduras

in this way: "The essential goal of the AID program in Honduras is to assist the Honduran Government in accelerating the forward movement of the economy. AID has selected four priority areas for program concentration—rural development, government planning and administration, human resources development, and industrial development. Complementary activities in which AID is also participating include malaria eradication, public safety, manpower and labor leadership training, and a program of mobile rural health units. Technical assistance on a grant basis amounted to approximately \$1.9 million in fiscal year 1965 and \$2.0 million is planned for fiscal year 1966. Development loans totaling \$0.5 million were authorized in fiscal year 1965 and a loan of \$5.2 was authorized to assist in the construction of 602 kilometers of rural, farm to market roads in October, 1965. This will open some 17 landlocked valleys in the Honduran interior and provide for their incorporation into the economy."

The United States Information Agency had a budget of \$248,355 for Honduras for fiscal year 1965, and the purposes of U.S.I.A. were as follows: (1) to encourage a political moderation and the peaceful return to constitutionality after the October, 1963, revolution; (2) to combat inroads by Communists, in government and the universities especially; (3) to promote the Alliance for Progress; (4) to promote Central American integration.

(Continued on page 51)

Earlier at Northwestern University, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of California, William S. Stokes has been at Claremont College since 1958. His research trips throughout Latin America have totaled seven since 1941, the latest being in 1964. The author of over 200 publications on Latin America, his best known works are *Latin American Politics* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959) and *Honduras, An Area Study in Government* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950).

Surveying the various small nations of the West Indies after their short-lived attempt at federation, this observer finds "in place of a great and powerful federation of close to four million people . . . the sad spectacle of insignificant power blocs built around the personality of small-island politicians. . . ."

The West Indies After the Federation

By THOMAS MATHEWS

Director of the Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico

Federation boil down to simply this
It's dog eat dog, and survival of the fittest
Everybody going for independence
Singularity¹

THE PEACEFUL BREAKING UP of the British empire in the Caribbean has been frustratingly slow and fraught with false starts and failures but it has produced two fairly stable young nations thus far and will probably produce one and perhaps two more during the coming year. Originally this empire contained almost twenty colonial units scattered throughout the Caribbean from British Honduras on the east coast of Central America around through the Greater and Lesser Antilles to British Guiana on the northeast coast of South America. The British flag, sugar cane, the English language, and a vague African heritage were the common denominators in most of these Caribbean colonies but these were not enough to surmount the geographical isolation in which the unique personality of each island thrived; for example, making the Bajan feel more Barbadian than West Indian.

Since as early as the last half of the nineteenth century Great Britain has been sporadically, and far too slowly, moving toward

some type of federation of its West Indian possessions. At first this interest in federation was motivated almost solely by anticipated economies through a more centralized colonial administration. Stimulated by the riots and strikes of the late 1930's depression and morally obligated by the pressure of world opinion after the Second World War, the British colonial office began haltingly to implement the recommendation of the earlier Moyne Commission (1938-1939) that a West Indian Federation be formed at a dominion level and as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The new West Indian Federation, which came into existence in 1958, was to have a very short life. In spite of the aggressive encouragement of the British colonial office (which in the opinion of some contributed rather to its demise²) and in spite of the personal enthusiasm and interest on the part of the prime ministers of Trinidad-Tobago and of Jamaica—by far the two largest and most important entities in the Federation—the West Indian Federation ceased to exist after scarcely four years of operation. Different levels of economic progress, population imbalances and pressures, and personality clashes between politicians were all problems faced by the new nation but these and other obstacles could have been surmounted if there had existed a deep common feeling of interest and sympathy as a West Indian, rather than as a Trinidadian, Jamaican,

¹ Calypso sung by Francisco Slinger, popularly known as The Mighty Sparrow, taken from *Party Politics in the West Indies* by C. L. R. James.

² See Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), especially chapter 5 on the West Indian Federation.

Antiguan or Barbadian, throughout the British West Indies.

On September 19, 1961, Jamaica voted in a referendum to pull out of the Federation and as Eric Williams, prime minister of Trinidad-Tobago, very adroitly said: "One taken away from 10 leaves zero." The dissolution of the Federation was a hard blow for the British since it destroyed the mechanism by which they had hoped to be relieved of some of their more burdensome colonies in the Caribbean. However, although the West Indian Federation may be dead, the West Indies still lives with its ghost.

In August of 1963, within a year after the failure of the West Indian Federation, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago became full fledged and completely independent members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In May of 1966 Guyana, now British Guiana, will join that group and, although no date has been set, Barbados also hopes to follow the road to independence. The destiny of the other remaining colonies is still undecided and unclear.

These newly independent nations, led for the most part by new leaders, are facing new problems which require new and untried formulas for solution and progress. In Jamaica and Trinidad, recently relieved of the burden of the white man, race tensions no longer polarize around the black-white extremes but appear unexpectedly and sometimes violently, as in British Guiana, between the black and the East Indian, or other minorities. Once the cry for land reform could always be counted on to secure for the politician an enthusiastic following but now the new leaders of the West Indies speak of industrialization and mechanization as the means whereby to achieve the better society. Finally, if the old style empire is disappearing from the British Caribbean there is abundant evidence to indicate that new, although certainly much smaller, power blocs and spheres of influence are filling the vacuum.

RACIAL STRIFE

They makin' so much confusion
'Bout race riot in England
They should kick them from Scotland Yard
We have the same question in Trinidad³

For the most part the exclusively white private clubs typical of the colonial era have disappeared from the British Caribbean but racial tensions have not. In fact, they have intensified as the white administrator and mediator has withdrawn from the Caribbean. In September, 1965, the ghetto of West Kingston erupted with violence, touched off by a racial incident between a Chinese proprietor and a Negro employee. Jamaica, proud of its motto: "Out of many, one people," is quite predominantly Negro but there are minorities and one of the largest of these is the Chinese, some 10,000 mostly occupied as small entrepreneurs.

The bloody violence which broke out in Georgetown, British Guiana, in February, 1962, has left a profound chasm between the African and East Indian populations of that country. The East Indian is in the majority in British Guiana, with an approximate 330,000 out of a 640,000 estimated population. The African numbers about 200,000 with another 70,000 identified as of mixed descent. The remaining 40,000 are divided unequally among the Amerindian, Chinese, and European. In September of 1965 a distinguished International Commission of Jurists was named to study charges of racial discrimination in areas of actual government responsibility and to make recommendations to eliminate such discrimination and racial imbalance as might be found in government offices. Whether the recommendations of this study group can fuse together a divided society remains to be seen.

In Trinidad, still spared the agony of violence, the same dissident racial elements exist but in reverse proportions. The African barely holds on to a rapidly diminishing plurality of the estimated million population. There are an estimated 350,000 East Indians and perhaps 390,000 Africans with another 140,000 identified as of mixed descent. The remaining 100,000 are Chinese, European or

³The Mighty Sparrow.

Middle Eastern. The party in power is led by the brilliant Negro historian, Eric Williams, and the opposition is led by an equally brilliant East Indian mathematician, Rudranath Capildeo. It is only a question of time before the fast-growing East Indian population, mostly in the rural rice and sugar cane areas, will outnumber the urban and industrial Negro, and thus allow an East Indian oriented party to replace the People's National Movement as the party in power. Meanwhile, Eric Williams has endeavored to broaden the racial base of his party and government but the degree of success in this effort is as yet very hard to measure. The best which can be said is that racial violence has been avoided but the tension still exists, perhaps just waiting for an ugly incident such as that in Jamaica to cause an explosion.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

As the British colonial areas of the Caribbean have achieved independence or have come closer to it more and more emphasis has been placed upon industrialization. An agriculturally based economy has been too long associated with a colonial status, and sugar and exploitation have been almost synonymous in the minds of most of the West Indians. Trinidad and British Guiana began to develop their mineral resources in the post-World War I period. The picture is different in Jamaica, which has been mining bauxite scarcely fifteen years. There, the government is now pushing plans for a nuclear power plant which will allow the intermediate step of converting bauxite into alumina to be carried out on the island. The Canadian aluminium company operating in Jamaica already has this step in operation but the three United States firms there are reluctant to follow since they risk provoking a suspended United States tariff on alumina. A nuclear power plant would make the case too strong to resist and thus provide more industrial jobs for Jamaicans.

The other smaller islands have no mineral resources to exploit and have been dependent up to now on sugar, bananas and spices, but even these small islands are now undergoing

a concentrated drive for industrialization. On Antigua the final touches are being completed on an oil refinery which, when production starts near the end of 1965, will produce 10,000 barrels a day. On densely populated Barbados, which has produced sugar almost exclusively for over three hundred years, an intensive industrial development program has shown negligible results thus far. Even the small and scattered British Virgin Islands with an estimated population of less than 8,000 has an agency for industrial development (although rum and the lucrative tourist industry are the only ones on the islands to date).

NEGLECT OF AGRICULTURE

In spite of the unbalanced attention being given to industrial development—to the neglect of agriculture—it is in the latter area that some immediate economic improvement could have an important effect. Both Trinidad and Jamaica have registered growing trade deficits since independence. In itself, as an economist might observe, a deficit in the balance of trade is not too alarming, since spending usually indicates that a community has money with which to secure its necessities. But when a sizable amount of this foreign spending is to secure food stuffs for islands with important agricultural enterprises then there is some cause for alarm. In Trinidad it has been recently estimated that much of the \$90 million used yearly to import food products could be saved by developing more intensively the dairy, meat, and poultry production on the island itself. Until now most government attention has been directed toward an increase in food production per acre, through improved and intensified cultivation. There is still much to be done in this direction particularly on an island like Antigua which is entering its fifth year of intense drought. Here government action to build up water reserves during the rainy season is long overdue. But further intensification of cultivation on say Barbados, where every square foot of land is already preciously guarded and protected, would produce little advantage. In Barbados,

British Guiana and Jamaica, the attention to agriculture must take a new approach by seeking to increase production per worker instead of per acre. This change in direction is extremely difficult to bring about particularly in countries with sizable blocks of the population unemployed—for example, Barbados, where recently five hundred people applied in person at a company which announced temporary work for a hundred laborers, or Jamaica with an estimated 150,000 unemployed. Nevertheless, the production of both sugar and rice will require mechanization if these basically agricultural countries of the Caribbean are to remain competitive.

OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

Some support from outside the Caribbean is received by these islands. Although the United States AID office in Trinidad has been closed and further support to that country is contingent on administrative reforms which will increase the effectiveness of any funds invested, three United States professors of business and public administration have been appointed to the Trinidad division of the University of the West Indies. In Jamaica, a small AID⁴ mission is maintained, providing technical assistance for the training of sanitary engineers, of personnel in urban renewal developments, and of persons involved in educational television production and presentation. The program also includes support and training for personnel concerned with marketing of vegetable produce and experts concerned with the dairy industry.

The most significant financial support from outside of the Caribbean comes from Canadian sources. Canada has made available to Jamaica alone \$2,375,000 (Canadian dollars) in 1964–1965. Thus, under Canada's Dominion Caribbean Assistance Programme, a half million dollars has been loaned to Jamaica for bridge construction and just recently Canada granted \$400,000 to St. Vincent for the expansion of its water system.

Other examples of Canadian support are the subsidized steamships, the *Maple* and the *Palm*, which ply back and forth regularly among all of the West Indian islands.

More financial support should be forthcoming from the United States because the West Indies buy heavily from the United States. This tendency has increased decidedly in the recently independent areas. For example, Jamaica during the 1950's bought a steady 40 per cent or more of her imports from the British Commonwealth. Now since independence this percentage has dropped to below 25 per cent and the chief nation to profit from this drop has been the United States.

INDEPENDENCE PREVAILS

Who is you to jump and quarrel
Look PNM⁵ is my lock, stock and barrel,
Who give you the privilege to object,
Pay your taxes, shut up and have respect
I am a power of strength, yes,
I am a powerful but modest,
Unless I'm forced to be blunt and ruthless
So shut up and don't squawk.

This ain't no skylark
When I talk no . . . dog bark
My word is law so watch your case
If you slip you slide
This is my place
And I say that Solomon will be
Minister of External Affairs
And you don't like it
Get to hell out of here!

Since the collapse of the West Indian Federation the islands and their leaders have sought their own independent paths. Alexander Bustamante, the prime minister of Jamaica, shoulders more responsibility for the collapse of the Federation than any other single politician. His cousin and political adversary, Norman Manley, failed to secure a majority vote in favor of remaining in the federation. After the plebiscite, as was expected, Manley resigned from office and in the subsequent election lost to Alexander Bustamante, who then took Jamaica on to its independence. Bustamante is now over eighty years of age, practically blind, and has already been hit by one coronary attack. He has turned over the day by day task of run-

⁴ Agency for International Development.

⁵ The P.N.M. (Peoples' National Movement) is the political party of Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad.

ning the government to younger men, notably the acting prime minister, Donald B. Sangster. His party, the People's National Party, is strong and the reason for this strength can be found in the young leaders Bustamante has allowed to come to the forefront. Sangster, backed by Edward Seaga (minister of development and welfare) and Robert Lightbourne (the minister of trade and industry), may feel sufficiently safe to hold elections in 1966 on their own merits and without the sheltering shadow of the tired old leader. Manley's opposition party has grown weaker mainly because Manley has refused to relinquish any of the leadership to the younger elements who are vying for it.

Except for an occasional trade mission to the eastern Caribbean and British Guiana, Jamaica has directed little attention to her former cohorts in the Federation. Her decision to go it alone is being strictly enforced. Jamaica could use the rice of British Guiana but the government is reluctant to force the change in consumer tastes just to accommodate a potential friend. Thus Forbes Burnham, prime minister of British Guiana, has been forced to continue the trade agreement of former prime minister Cheddi Jagan with Fidel Castro in Cuba.

The attitude of Trinidad-Tobago after the dissolution of the Federation was completely different from that of Jamaica but because of the forcefulness with which this policy was expressed the end result has been just about the same. Eric Williams was convinced that the West Indian Federation failed because the power of the federal government was weaker than its component parts. Therefore, he made known his continued commitment to the concept of West Indian nationhood—to be realized through the unification of the islands of the eastern Caribbean with the government of Trinidad-Tobago. This proposition for a unified state under the leadership of Trinidad found few sympathizers in the other islands. Only Grenada, whose surplus population has been spilling over into Trinidad ever since the discovery of oil on the latter island, expressed a willingness to consider this invitation seri-

ously. Trinidad has done little to acknowledge Grenada's acceptance since the prospect of uniting with a predominantly Negro population has met considerable resistance from the sizable East Indian minority in Trinidad.

The obvious solution to Williams' impasse would be to accept into the state predominantly East Indian British Guiana. There, Forbes Burnham, a left-wing socialist, holds the reins of government only through an uneasy coalition with a John Birchite-type minority party led by wealthy rum producer Pêter d'Aguiar. Between Williams and Burnham there is a great degree of agreement in philosophy and interest but a petty personality clash has developed to the point that, as of now, the two are no longer on speaking terms. Thus Trinidad-Tobago, with the patiently waiting Grenada, stands in splendid isolation, just about as alone as Jamaica.

The prospects for cooperation among the rest of the islands is not much brighter. Barbados took the initiative to continue conversations with the other island leaders concerning the possibility of organizing a new federation which was popularly referred to as the Little Eight. With the negative response of Grenada, the original little eight was reduced to a smaller little seven. If Great Britain had shown the same enthusiasm she had demonstrated for the larger Federation and had agreed to underwrite the expenses of the operation during its first years of existence, the "Federation of the Little Seven" (Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Montserrat, and Barbados) would have become a reality. This guarantee was inexcusably delayed several years (1962-1965) and meanwhile the enthusiasm of the islands waned and politicians began to argue over the nature of the federa-

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Looking at Mexico with a well-trained eye, this author believes that as the nation "finds itself on the verge of economic and social modernity, a nagging problem for Díaz Ordaz is how to develop Mexico's comparatively underdeveloped political system along the lines promised by his predecessors and urged by increasingly larger numbers of Mexicans." Government ownership constitutes another problem for the administration.

Mexico: 1966 and Beyond

By FRANK BRANDENBURG

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ON DECEMBER 1, 1965, mildly progressive Gustavo Díaz Ordaz completed his first year as president of Mexico amid signs that his six-year term was off to an excellent start. Like the transfer of power every six years since World War II, the transition from incumbent to new administration was peaceful and orderly. Political stability was preserved, basic freedoms were allowed a fair measure of expression, and foreign policy faced no particularly critical situations that might have embarrassed the new government at home or abroad. In the economic sector, unlike slowdowns in economic activity accompanying the first year of previous governments, business conditions suffered perceptibly little. Education, public housing and social welfare measures generally received the relatively high levels of investment characteristic of López Mateos' years in power. All in all, considered in the light of traditional experience in Mexico, Díaz Ordaz had an exceptionally superior first year.

To retain this pace of development and bring about higher economic and social levels in 1966 and beyond, the new president recently announced a development program based on orderly progress. Under the slogan of "work and concord," he promised to accelerate industrial growth, stimulate output and raise living standards in agriculture, and control monetary and credit expansion in curbing

inflation. His policy included the additional commitment to improve the distribution of income and wealth, correct distortions in the balance of payments, and welcome foreign investment to continue to participate in Mexican growth. The precise way in which these big promises are to be fulfilled will be spelled out in a Five-Year Development Plan to take effect early in 1966.

Although details of the plan have not been made public, its implementation will depend on the capacity of the new administration to provide reasonable and feasible answers to three basic questions in Mexico's development:

- 1) How can existing political procedures, based on rule from the top down, on shallow political opposition, and on relatively impotent legislatures, judiciaries and local government, be brought into line with Mexico's increasingly impressive achievements in education and economic and social development?

- 2) In making adjustments for Mexico's rapid population growth, what policies should the country pursue on the issue of changing existing capacities in the different production areas?

- 3) How far, in what directions, and for what purposes should government take over control of resources or influence their use?

The range of choices available to Díaz Ordaz on these important issues is naturally

restricted by the heavy weight of the decisions of his predecessors and the hard realities of Mexico's capacities for development. In the actual policies pursued in his initial year as president, in his "work and concord" program, and in other activities, Díaz Ordaz has shown awareness of this limitation.

GREATER POLITICAL MATURITY

Mexico is ruled by an élite, or Revolutionary Family, composed of the men who have run the country for over half a century, have laid the policy lines of the Revolution, and today retain effective decision-making power. At the top, there is an inner council which includes the head of the Revolutionary Family—Díaz Ordaz—assisted by a few powerful national and regional political leaders, wealthy individuals, labor chiefs, technocrats and intellectuals. This council keeps the Revolution intact and rolling forward by understanding and defining the relative power of the major vested interests. Since Ruiz Cortines entered the presidency in 1952, these vested interests, which form a second level of the Family hierarchy, have been represented by about 200 spokesmen from business, labor, government, education, agriculture, the press, and religious, professional, and social organizations. The third level of the Family hierarchy is the formal apparatus headed by the President of Mexico in his immediate capacity as president. It embraces the national political party, captive opposition parties, and state and local public administration.¹

As the system has developed, the incumbent President of Mexico or president-elect, delivers the definitive word on every matter, or someone else rises to take his place as head of the Family. Aggregation of interests can develop both inside and outside the Family, but

in the last instance demands are judged by the head of the Family. When he does not also hold the office of President of Mexico, presidential authority is regularly questioned and ignored in favor of the Family head. When no single leader is capable of gaining undisputed recognition as head of the Family, or when a leader, on gaining it, proves incapable of being a truly strong father, multiple leadership temporarily results—but only temporarily.

Once elevated to the high lordship of Mexico, the Family head constantly must prove that he, and he alone, runs the nation. Thus, within the Mexican milieu, the political sun rises and sets every six years on the presidency, and in identical cycles on gubernatorial offices. Mexicans avoid personal dictatorship by retiring their dictators every six years. "The power of a president of Mexico," as an inner-circle politician once observed, "has no limit but that of time, his six years in office."

Such executive supremacy is the key to understanding the realities and dynamics of the Mexican political system. Checks and balances, separation of powers, and restraints exercised by legislative and judicial agents are weak safeguards against executive power. The belief that Mexico's official party really governs Mexico by virtue of somehow exercising the dominant influence in selection of presidents, governors and other elected officials is fallacious.² A president is chosen in the last instance by the Revolutionary Family head who has no responsibility to discuss his selection with the official party; he in fact announces to the official party who "its candidate" will be in a presidential election. Presidents select governors, who in turn select municipal presidents.

There is no "intra-party democracy," "one-party democracy," or related system of popular front government. Even if official party sectors rather than the president and state governors cut up the electoral pie for the nomination of state deputies, federal deputies and (federal) senators, this function is peripheral to the exercise of real power in Mexico. No effective power is at stake anyway; a state legislature obsequiously follows the state

¹ Much of the material in this section is based on the author's book, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

² This belief, arising from a modified version of the popular-front concept emphasizing "one-party democracy" and centralization of political power in official party organization, is developed in Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), and Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959).

leader, be he governor, regional strongman or governor-designate, just as the federal legislature rubber-stamps the dictates of the Family head.

The present system has three obvious advantages. First, and vital to every political system, it works. Despite its sharp contradictions of fundamental provisions in Mexico's constitution and electoral laws, it provides political stability, peaceful transfer of power, a fair measure of political freedom and a workable formula for the eternal problem of patronage. The system has helped Mexico achieve notable social and economic progress, and has resulted in an improved tolerance among the Mexican people and between them and their governors. Presidents have become less fearful of the people, and people less afraid of their presidents.

The dilemma of Díaz Ordaz is whether increasingly higher levels of educational, social and economic achievements are compatible with Mexico's Machiavellian political system. Every six-year administration brings with it a turnover of about 18,000 "elective" offices. While such firm adherence to the no re-election principle probably represents an improvement over the indefinite terms of office characterizing pre-Revolutionary days, this should not indicate that the benefits accruing to the administration from a shorter term today are less than they were from a longer term yesterday. Six years now provide ample opportunity to accumulate sufficient resources to retire from political life. Educated Mexicans are keenly aware that the president and governors inhibit the exercise of effective suffrage in choosing these thousands of officials. Some would like legislatures and judiciaries to acquire autonomy and exercise restraint on executive power. Mexico's present system insults the intelligence of the Mexicans however much it may convince the foreign scholar that it works in the way propaganda says it does. Mexicans are told by their government that they have effective suffrage. They do not. They are told that effective opposition exists. It does not. Thus, as Mexico

finds itself on the verge of economic and social modernity, a nagging problem for Díaz Ordaz is how to develop Mexico's comparatively underdeveloped political system along the lines promised by his predecessors and urged by increasingly larger numbers of Mexicans.

MEXICO VERSUS MALTHUS

In making adjustments for Mexico's rapid population growth, what policies should the country pursue on the issue of changing existing capacities in the different production areas? The answer to this question depends in part upon evaluation of the effects on freedom of individuals—on considerations raised in the previous paragraphs on achieving greater political maturity and introduced subsequently on ownership issues. Here, we are primarily concerned with technical-economic aspects of such issues as investment in agriculture versus investment in industry and expenditures for roads versus direct outlays for agriculture and industry. More specifically, given the complexity of determining costs and benefits of alternative ways of allocating resources, we may restrict our inquiry to one aspect of this series of issues: Mexico's capacity to feed its burgeoning population by domestic food production.

The central question in the Malthusian proposition of impending starvation as it applies to Mexico is whether population will outdistance basic food supply and force Mexico into dependence on the outside world for large-scale food imports.³ Mexicans are of course not eating so well as Americans, nor is there promise of their doing this for years to come. At the same time, there is no biological reason why the Mexicans, or, for that matter, future Americans, must consume as much as present-day Americans. As Mexico is now feeding her people, however, perhaps 10 per cent are eating well, another 10 per cent fairly well, and 30 per cent modestly; 40 per cent are eating little more than "beans and tortillas," and 10 per cent are just barely managing to obtain the rough equivalent of one daily meal of beans and tortillas. If present trends in demography persist, in three

³ Material in this section is based on chapter 9 of *The Making of Modern Mexico*.

decades Mexico will have to feed a population of 100 million inhabitants and, coupled with increasingly higher levels of education, feed it better than it feeds some 40 million today.

To accomplish this, Mexico will have to cultivate additional acreage and raise overall productivity by boosting output per acre. Adverse climate, lack of credit and of farm machinery, irrigation needs, fear of unfavorable government action, and other forces all combine to restrict the amount of land presently cultivated to about only 40 per cent of the estimated total of 75 million acres available for agricultural use. This 40 per cent, or 30 million acres, small as the amount may sound for a country with 485 million acres of national territory, is an impressive 50 per cent higher than the 20 million acres cultivated a decade earlier, and double the acreage worked 20 to 30 years ago. While the amount of cultivated land has been increasing, the proportion devoted to beans and corn is still extraordinarily high. Somewhat more than three-fifths of Mexico's land now under cultivation is given to raising these Siamese twins of the nation's diet. Wheat and rice are gaining acreage, as are cotton, coffee, sugar and tomatoes. Very recently, the government launched a program to reduce the quantity of land devoted to raising cotton and coffee.

Increases that have taken place in agricultural output in Mexico since 1945 are attributable mainly to medium-size farms and large-scale commercial farming. The traditional sector of agriculture, composed mainly but by no means entirely of tiny farms, has shared the least in the increases that have taken place in output. To convert traditional agriculture into an engine of growth will, all agree, require investment in farm people and reproducible capital. Differences appear in the consideration of the kinds of investment required. Better transportation, storage and distribution facilities, mechanization, the use of irrigation, better seeds, fertilizers, pesticides—the success of measures like these will depend in large measure on the response of Mexico's farm people to economic incentives.

Such responses have apparently been relatively low among substantial numbers of farm people in Mexico.

Thus, action in several areas will be necessary to defeat Malthus.

New irrigation. Most of Mexico's 11 million acres irrigated today are a result of public investment. Since 1926, the ratio of new investment in irrigation to total public expenditures has averaged more than 10 per cent. If an additional 2.7 million acres, of the estimated 14.8 million to 24.7 million acres of additional agricultural land irrigable by surface waters alone, were irrigated every six years, Mexico would double the amount of irrigated land in less than 25 years. The cost of such a program would amount to about \$95 million annually at the current price of \$425 per new hectárea (2.47 acres) placed under irrigation—the equivalent of less than 7 per cent of projected public expenditures. Even if the cost of irrigating new lands increases in the years ahead, government revenue should also increase. Hence, to do his part in irrigating more land, Díaz Ordaz will have to allocate about 7 per cent of public expenditures to irrigation.

New croplands. Our southern neighbor possesses 74 million acres of cultivable land, of which about 34 million are now cultivated and 40 million are relatively idle. On the record of the 1950's, it is not unreasonable to expect that an additional 27 million acres could be placed under cultivation in the next three decades. Díaz Ordaz can help bring cultivable land not now under cultivation into productive use by making rates of return in agriculture more attractive and land ownership more secure.

Further mechanization. The use of tractors, harrows, cultivators, seeders, plows, and other modern farm implements will have to increase to bring about higher levels of productivity. A 25 per cent increase in output in the next three decades merely as a result of further mechanization is regarded as a modest estimate by Mexican specialists. Díaz Ordaz can assist during his administration by making farm credit available on more liberal terms.

Extensive use of fertilizers, insecticides and fungicides. With only five million acres of farmlands using commercial fertilizers and even less using insecticides and fungicides, Díaz Ordaz can contribute to increases in productivity by improving distribution systems, supplying easier credit, and providing appropriate technical education for the peasants. Leaning on the conservative side, it seems that greater use of fertilizers, insecticides, and fungicides should account for at least a 25 per cent increase in productivity in the next three decades.

Better seeds, crop rotation, changes in crops raised and improved handling. The total effect of these improvements in the next three decades should be such as to raise output at least 50 per cent. Any development plan of the present administration will have to make provision for contributing to this goal.

Between 1965 and 1995, Mexico's population probably will increase from about 40 million inhabitants to somewhere between 90 million and 102 million inhabitants, depending on whether estimates of low, medium or high rates of growth prove accurate. This will represent a percentage increase of from 229 per cent to 260 per cent. Meanwhile, what will be happening in agriculture if the above steps are taken?

By placing new lands under cultivation and irrigating some of them, and taking care that erosion does not render presently cultivable lands unusable for agriculture, Mexico would increase output value 197.5 per cent.⁴ Then, through the use of mechanization, fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, better seeds, crop rotation, changes in crops raised and improved handling, output should increase another 185 per cent.⁵ The sum of these two percentages

⁴ There will probably be 25 million hectáreas under cultivation, an increase of 185 per cent over 1964, made up of 15 million hectáreas of non-irrigated land.

⁵ The combined weight of farm mechanization (25 per cent), fertilizers, insecticides, and fungicides (25 per cent), and better seeds, crop rotation, changes in crops raised, and improved handling (50 per cent) should account for a 100 per cent increase.

⁶ Statistics in this section are taken from the author's book, *The Development of Latin American Private Enterprise* (Washington: National Planning Association, 1964).

suggests that by 1995 Mexico may expand crop output about 332.5 per cent. Thus, even without taking account of the effects of selling lower proportions of agricultural crops abroad and of reorienting output toward the urban quarter, we can see that accomplishing these goals would provide Mexican food production with a comfortable margin over estimated growth in population. Díaz Ordaz will have to commit his administration to programs in this direction if Mexico is to stave off starvation by domestic food production and thus disprove the gloomy philosophers who are predicting inevitable famine in Mexico.

How far, in what directions, and for what purposes should government take over control of resources or affect their use? Government in Mexico has acquired ownership in one sector of economic activity after another. From before the Revolution of 1910 to the present day, public investment has acquired equity positions in the telegraph industry; railroads; petroleum industry; chemical plants; banks and related financial institutions; steel, textile, and lumber mills; airlines; electric power; basic consumer goods distribution; mining and smelting; warehousing; and telephones. One result is indicated by statistics⁶ on ownership of the largest (judging by capital and reserves or their approximate equivalents) enterprises in Mexico.

	Top 10	Top 20	Top 30
Mexican			
Government	100.0%	88.5%	82.2%
Mexican Private	0.0	8.7	13.9
Foreign Private	0.0	2.8	3.9

In all Latin America only Mexico and Cuba exhibit an ownership structure in which the 10 largest enterprises are exclusively state owned. Even excluding investment of petroleum companies in Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, and copper exporters in Chile, the proportion of state ownership in Mexico is a great deal higher than that in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru or Venezuela. Mexico's two largest enterprises, the National Railways and the Federal Electricity Commis-

sion, each account for greater financial resources than that represented by total private investment, Mexican and foreign, in the top 30 enterprises combined. Government equity is found in 19 of the top 30 enterprises, of which the state owns 14 outright.

Previous six-year administrations have seemed too little concerned about the economic consequences of increasing state ownership. If ownership trends of the two score years since 1926 persist for many more years, private investment will be virtually eliminated from every significant business activity in Mexico. In making decisions on the ownership mix, Díaz Ordaz will be influenced by the need to do something about the disparity between primitive and advanced elements in the population, the sources of funds available for development, and the irresistible pressure on government for development. But unlike his successors, he will find less justification for new takeovers on the old grounds of widespread antipathy for foreign private enterprise, the existence of an irresponsible class of local entrepreneurs, or the demonstration of economies of authoritarian governments.

It is probable that he and his successors may argue that in order to provide economic growth, government will have to undertake an investment which private enterprise finds unattractive or for which it lacks capital or feels technically unqualified. Though acceptable to the masses, the argument that government ownership is required to eliminate or prevent private monopoly has been weakened by experience showing that in many instances regulation of private monopoly is preferable to its elimination and replacement by government monopoly. Nor would it appear adequate any longer to say that a weak private sector is either a sufficient reason or a necessary reason for increased amounts of government ownership. It is certainly insufficient in the sense that substituting government for private enterprise offers no assurance of bringing about the entrepreneurship desired; rather, it is likely that the conditions inhibiting private enterprise will similarly impede government enterprise.

Government in Mexico should now attempt

to answer four highly relevant questions: 1) Has government ownership of productive enterprises monopoly proved more socially responsible than private ownership? 2) Has government monopoly proved less difficult to control than private monopoly? 3) Has government enterprise proved more efficient than private enterprise? 4) Can government better fulfill national objectives by applying its limited resources to purposes other than investment in enterprises which private entrepreneurship is capable of managing?

If one differentiates rapid growth in underdeveloped countries outside the Communist orbit from those with slowest growth, it begins to be clear that economic growth has a higher promise in countries experiencing the spread of an atmosphere favoring greater economic freedom. As the basic infrastructure of an economy like Mexico's is completed, the relative absence of direct government ownership of industry has had decided advantages for more rapid growth. Since 1955, Mexico's rate of economic growth has not ranked among the 15 highest underdeveloped countries, such as Israel, Spain, Greece, Thailand, El Salvador or Trinidad. Mexico may learn valuable lessons about ownership mixes from these rapid growth countries.

With Mexico on the verge of economic modernity, Díaz Ordaz will have to give increasing consideration to ways to accelerate growth by shifting public revenue out of certain sectors and into other sectors. One way to provide sorely needed capital for poorly developed and undeveloped sectors of Mexico's industry is to sell public shares in industries now owned wholly or partly by government. Private ownership in some industries now managed by government would have the additional benefit of lowering the barriers to creative entrepreneurial forces. Instead of

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Writing on Cuba today this author says, "one major issue has long been the relations between the 'old Communist militants' . . . and the 'new Communist militants'." From the makeup of the new central committee "it would seem that, if the 'old militants' and the Russians have won the argument over agriculture vs. industry, they have lost . . . over who is to run the new party."

Cuba Seven Years After

By DAVID D. BURKS

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THE CUBAN REVOLUTION has been marked since Castro took over in 1959 by a high degree of internal tension and political disequilibrium. The leaders of the regime continue to make basic changes in organization and policy as they frenetically search for successful institutional frameworks. The many striking events of the last year in Cuba have reflected less the propensity of Castro for dramatic announcements than the deep-seated internal problems yet unresolved by the leadership after seven years. Foreign policy has been complicated by the Sino-Soviet split, and Soviet dissatisfaction with the pace of Cuba's economic recovery. (The Russians have successfully insisted that Cuba accept the division of labor in the socialist world by concentrating on sugar production.)

In the domestic affairs of Cuba one major issue has long been the relations between the "old Communist militants," or former members of the P.S.P. (*Partido Socialista Popular*), and the "new Communist militants," the former members of the 26th of July and the Revolutionary Directorate. Although ideological issues fed this conflict, the basic concern of which group would actually control the government of Cuba was more important. The first single party under Castro—the *Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas* (O.R.I.)—died aborning because of the "old militant" attempts, led by Aníbal Escalante,

to dominate it. After Escalante was purged in March, 1962, the regime dismantled O.R.I. and used only part (perhaps a very small part) of its membership for the new P.U.R.S.C. (*Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista de Cuba* or United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution), now named the *Partido Comunista de Cuba* (P.C.C.).

The "old-new militant" controversy has been put to rest for the time being in the P.C.C. The 100-member central committee of the *Partido Comunista de Cuba* was announced in early October, 1965, to replace the 24-member national directorate of the P.U.R.S.C. The central committee is headed by an eight-member politbureau composed of Fidel and Raúl Castro (first and second secretaries respectively), President Osvaldo Dorticós, Juan Almeida (deputy armed forces minister), Ramiro Valdes (interior minister), Armando Hart (ex-education minister), Major Sergio Del Valle (armed forces chief-of-staff); and Major Guillermo García (armed forces commander in western Cuba). Within the central committee Raúl Castro is chairman of the commission on state security; Dorticós is in charge of the economic commission; and Hart is now secretary of organization and chairman of the education commission. None of these individuals are "old Communists." Thus, it would seem that if the "old militants" and the Russians have won the argument over agriculture vs. indus-

try, they have lost the argument over who is to run the new party.

The "old militants" are not, however, excluded from the central committee. Although it is not really clear in what proportion the "old" and "new" Communists are represented on the central committee, it seems probable that the "old" are in the minority. In fact, there are two "old militants" on the six-man secretariat—Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez—and they could have considerable power except for the fact that Raúl and Fidel Castro, President Dorticós, and one other "new militant" are also members. Blas Roca is the only "old Communist" heading a commission—the one responsible for the preparation of a new constitution and, possibly, for elections.

As a consequence of the creation of a single party, the two major ideological newspapers, *Revolución* and *Hoy*, are to be merged into a single daily with the title *Granma*, in honor of the boat Castro used to reach Cuba in December, 1956. There were some differences in approach and coverage between these two newspapers, but *Hoy* had the widest circulation and was usually the official spokesman for the government. The new paper is to be run by an "old militant," Isidoro Malmierca. The other two dailies in Havana and the daily in Santiago apparently will still be published, but their circulation is small and their impact slight.

PARTY MAKEUP

Below the level of the central committee, party construction seems to be proceeding according to a standard pattern. Possible exceptions are in Oriente, where the source of members is different, and in the military and in the interior ministry (internal security) where special circumstances obtain. In the Sierra Maestra range of Oriente, the mountain militia companies, composed principally of peasants, are an important source of party members. Oriente is an exception for a strange assortment of reasons. The Castros have from the days of the war in the Sierra Maestra paid special attention to the province and have in some ways given it pre-

ferred status. Doubtless, sentiment is important here, but there is also the obvious concern over the Sierra Maestra mountains as the best physical locale for any successful anti-Castro guerrilla movement (though little such activity has occurred here in contrast to the Escambray). An ideological need can also be discerned: to continue the identification of the regime with the peasant. (The peasants of Oriente most nearly fit the party line on downtrodden peasant masses now uplifted by the regime.)

An example of a more typical process of party formation can be seen in Camaguey province where, in contrast to Oriente, peasant cells were established much more slowly than worker cells in 1964 and 1965. By June, 1964, there were 698 cells in existence with 6,468 members, who represented 7.67 per cent of the total number of workers employed in the places of work which had been organized. A total of 416 candidate members had also been selected. The cells in most cases, however, were not functioning as effective organizations and thus failed to meet problems of production (for example, absenteeism and work norms) as they arose.

THE F.A.R.

In the revolutionary armed forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias*—F.A.R.), the creation of party units is governed by special rules that do not apply elsewhere. Significantly, in the official statement on the P.U.R.S.C. (now P.C.C.), F.A.R. states that the primary function of the party in the F.A.R. is to assure military loyalty and efficiency: it "has as [its] permanent task helping the leaders in . . . the strict fulfillment of missions assigned . . . by the National Director of PURSC . . . of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of FAR." Fidel and Raúl Castro hold dual roles in that they head the military both as party leaders and as government officials.

Fidel Castro is first secretary of the party and commander-in-chief. Raúl Castro as second secretary is charged with party work within F.A.R. and is also the minister of the armed forces.

Within F.A.R. as of July, 1965, 1,304 cells had been set up, as well as some units above the cell level. Cells are to include all Communists at company level regardless of rank. However, the correctness of an officer's orders to his men are not to be discussed by the party unit at his level but are to be judged only by his superior officers and by party units at a higher level. An official statement also says, "The principle of democratic centralism is applied in such a way that it does not violate the hierarchical steps [chain of command] and that it does not impair either the discipline or authority of the leaders."

Fragmentary evidence so far available shows that many members of the F.A.R. cells are men who have joined the army or the militia since January, 1959; that they are predominantly of lower-class background; and that many have taken part in the continuing fight against the guerrillas as members of the Cuban equivalent of a special forces group. These *Lucha Contra Bandidos* forces are elite troops which are highly politicized. There are also a few pre-1959 Castro supporters discernible in the cells but few, if any, "old militants." Because other Communist countries have found the meshing of party and military difficult and because of past Cuban "old-new Communist" tensions, problems in the functioning of P.C.C.-F.A.R. can be expected.

THE ECONOMY

The condition of the Cuban economy is not healthy but the exact degree of deterioration is not easy to determine. The Cuban leaders have freely admitted their errors but seem to have shown little progress in learning from them. As one Cuban commentator wrote in the daily *El Mundo*, "The five years that have already passed by in the revolutionary process have been lavish in useful lessons." The regime now admits that rapid and complete redistribution of wealth during its first years in power gravely weakened the country's productive capacity. The Cuban people literally ate up the cattle herds, for example, to the point that breeding stock was badly depleted. Production of food for domestic consumption

has been below consumption levels and rationing for a wide range of commodities has been in effect since early 1962. During the last year surpluses were produced of at least two commodities (eggs and mangoes) but not for long, as shortages followed. The renewed emphasis upon sugar has led to conversion of food producing lands to sugar cane, raising the specter of increased problems of food supply.

Castro has now, for all practical purposes, given up the goal of industrialization in order to produce ten million tons of sugar by 1970. The present plan calls for the development, in later years, of agriculturally-based or related industry (for example, byproducts through the use of sugar chemistry or a machine industry supplying the sugar industry).

SUGAR PRODUCTION

A number of steps have been taken to revive sugar production. A separate sugar ministry was created in June, 1964, headed by a "new militant." The Soviets sent cane loading and cutting machines—some 500–700 combines in all—which, according to Cuban publications, tended to break down in operation. As in past years, voluntary (and often high cost) labor made up for the shortage of paid workers, but again as in past years regular workers resisted mechanization and work by brigades. In Camaguey, volunteer labor at one point reached 63 per cent of the total used in the *zafra*. To ease the shortage of agricultural workers, the government hopes to reverse the migration to the cities, especially Havana, by making rural living conditions more attractive. The labor minister decreed early in 1965 that workers who in prior years had customarily worked in the sugar industry could be forced to return for the harvest or at other times for repair and maintenance work. Modernization and mechanization of sugar mills, improvement of railroad transport and improvement of port facilities are other steps to be taken.

Sugar production began declining in 1962 to a crop of 4.8 million tons and fell to 3.8

million tons in 1963. In 1964 it rose to 4.4 and, in 1965, rose again to something less than six million tons. In the meantime (and partly as a consequence) the world market price dropped catastrophically (from 13 cents to less than 2.0 cents a pound or below the cost of production in pre-Castro Cuba) reducing the Cuban take from sugar sold in the free world to a figure below that for low-harvest years. In 1963 and 1964, Cuba was not able to supply promised sugar to the Communist bloc which, in turn, had to sell more goods to Cuba on credit.

Sugar production, but even more coffee and tobacco production, was hurt by the second agrarian reform of October, 1963, which changed the proportion of the state and private lands from roughly 40-60 to 70-30 per cent. The 30 per cent now consists of farms of 165 acres or less, the owners of which are organized in the *Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños* (A.N.A.P.). Though the A.N.A.P. sector produces substantially more than its share of agricultural commodities, the government has not been able fully to prevent their diversion into the black market or their consumption in too large a quantity by the farmers, themselves. Campaigns for "voluntary" renunciation of consumption of certain foods by the farmers only highlight the problem without solving it.

The government, for its part, has failed to supply enough fertilizer, barbed wire, and similar supplies; government tractor stations have not given enough service. But, fundamentally, the government needs to make consumer goods available in larger amounts to the farmers and, more importantly, to tighten its collection system. Yet, there will continue to be small farmer discontent and restiveness because Castro has never hidden his determination to socialize all land, however distant in the future that step may be.

SOVIET PRESSURE

The Soviet Union has pressured Castro to reform the administration of the economy. Much bloc criticism has been directed at the extreme centralization of economic administration; Castro has, through conviction

or necessity, or both, come to echo the Soviet line. The system of planning and coordination boards paralleling the producing and distributing units at all levels still exists but is being supplemented and even partially supplanted by the party which is taking over the function of supervision at the regional level. Castro has also assigned the task of picking local government officials to the regional party level, under a program to increase local independence of central government ministries.

The mismanagement, impractical planning, and red tape found throughout the economy are other aspects of the larger problems labeled bureaucracy. Castro is currently leading a vigorous campaign against this bureaucracy. Newspaper columnists inveigh against bus drivers who refuse to stop for passengers; government shops which return appliances unrepaired; and factories which refuse to produce men's shirts in the extra large sizes. Such publicized complaints lead to self-criticism meetings in the guilty enterprise, but little or no improvement in service—judging by the frequency of complaints in the press.

SELECTION OF OFFICIALS

The criteria for selection of officials for the bureaucracy has at one time or another stressed competence or revolutionary commitment. In August, 1965, Castro announced that loyalty to the revolution would be placed first; this, said Castro, was possible because enough revolutionary cadres had been trained to take over and destroy the petty bourgeois spirit which he said was responsible for the bureaucratic failings. The cadres have often been trained in intensive short courses, but it is doubtful that they are well trained.

Economic dislocation and decline have encouraged passive resistance and a low worker morale in Cuba. Economic incentives are practically nonexistent because of the consumer goods shortages, though free vacations for a few workers, medical service, and similar social services are still possible alternatives. The government seems to have consciously rejected the use of most of the ma-

terial incentives now stressed in the Soviet Union. In place of these methods, Castro says ideological indoctrination, creation of a new socialist morality, and police repression will serve.

SECURITY MEASURES

Undoubtedly Castro needs to spur the flagging spirit of his people and, also, he undoubtedly has been concerned over a lack of enthusiasm, passive resistance, absenteeism, and, until late 1964, the guerrillas. More recently, impartial observers have failed to detect any organized resistance against the government and have reported only very sporadic and largely isolated incidents of public discontent. Nonetheless a tightening of internal security has taken place, much more than would seem to be demanded by any clear and present danger to the regime. Perhaps Cuba is entering a period of Stalinist repression, motivated by the unpredictable emotions and vague fears of Castro in addition to economic troubles.

The suppression of the guerrillas in Camaguey and Mantanzas Provinces and the Escambray mountains of Las Villas Province was difficult in the sense that, as one band was captured and executed, a new one would appear. The stationing of extensive forces in the mountains, forced migration of peasants from the areas, and in addition intensive educational and social welfare programs in some regions were other means used against guerrillas. Meanwhile, the second agrarian reform weakened the economic support for the guerrillas. One would guess, though, that other guerrilla bands will appear from time to time. As far as this writer knows, however, none were reported in 1965. There were some exile incursions but these are separate and distinct and originated outside Cuba.

Economic crimes are now recognized in Cuban law and are judged by special courts. The definition of these crimes is broad and seems to be evolving toward that used in Russia during the Stalinist period. Regime spokesmen have used the slogan "you don't eat if you don't work," and those who are

not working can be arrested for "criminal tendencies." The regime attributes most common crime to parasitic elements remaining from the capitalist system (prostitutes, gamblers and egoists) and most other crimes to the bourgeois mentality of many Cubans.

Because of this Communist approach to delinquency and crime, the ministry of the interior has among its duties "the maintenance and development of a new socialist morality" and the struggle against "ideological diversionism." The ministry combats elements that are "instruments of exotic currents" and have "negative positions on work" and it fights against "social illnesses and blemishes." The regime has learned that economic restructuring does not necessarily bring the required ideological changes nor does it automatically mold "the new Communist man" sought by the regime. Protecting the purity of culture and education would seem now to fall under the ministry's jurisdiction. According to some reports the police have begun to harass artists, musicians, and intellectuals who deviate from the normal standards of dress and social behavior.

THE ARTS AND EDUCATION


This development represents a substantial change in policy. The Cuban revolution in its first years stimulated a flowering in the arts, publishing, sciences, and related fields. The government through the National Council of Culture; the Cuban Institute for the Arts and the Motion Picture Industry; the Academy of Sciences; the National Publishing House; and the National Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation has expended and still expends considerable sums on mass culture and recreation. Beyond this, there was the emotional and idealistic enthusiasm of young revolutionaries in the first flush of utopianism. Foreign observers were struck by the freedom of expression, the imaginative use of limited resources, and the high artistic achievements.

But "old militants" worked from the first for a firm government policy on the arts and intellectuals; they worked for one that would, in effect, duplicate Soviet policy. They still

have not won a complete victory, and there is not yet a party line of socialist realism in Cuba, but that day does not seem far off.

The emergence of cultural and intellectual orthodoxy can best be seen in the field of education. The government has officially declared war on intellectualism—defined as the wrong interpretation of science and culture—and on “idealist concepts” which do not transform but whose advocates use them to slow the revolution. “Better than reading history,” said one Cuban leader, “is making it and that is what the revolution is doing.” To motivate the student, the schools are to rely on socialist emulation and on moral, rather than material, incentives. Schools are to place emphasis upon practical knowledge of agriculture—especially sugar production—to help Cuba win the battle of the *Zafra*. At the primary level, particularly, the schools are to be closely linked with the military services through mutual sponsorship of schools and military units. In the primary schools and in the related youth organization known as “Pioneers,” one aim is for the organization of Circles of Friends of the Armed Forces of the Revolution to gird infantry training and teach military games. Students must be taught that obligatory military service is not a burden, but a revolutionary obligation. But above all else, the students are “to drink from the experiences of Fidel” in order to learn the proper attitude toward life.

In the universities, as in the lower levels of education, these changes in policy have been reflected. The April, 1965, purge of students at the University of Havana exemplifies the new attitude toward learning and education. Those purged had been guilty of lack of enthusiasm for the revolution, inattention to studies, unwillingness to volunteer for militia duty or cane cutting, and other less than perfect revolutionary attitudes. The purging process may have also removed some homosexuals or other deviates. These purged students were mainly peasants’ and workers’ children on government scholarships. The purging procedures became ludicrous; meetings of students were asked to vote on expulsion of other students



CUBA

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by putting thumbs up or thumbs down.

While atheism has been officially adopted, the regime has so far refrained from attacks on religious practices as such. The Catholic Church, its political and social influence destroyed in 1961, carefully avoids antagonizing the regime and is allowed to hold religious services. Only 250 priests (of 800 in 1959) remain but the government has agreed to the entry of some foreign priests. Protestants have also run into repression.

Jehovah's Witnesses, the Pentacostals, and the Gideons were the first target when, in 1963, they were accused of counterrevolutionary activities by Fidel. Cuban Baptist clergymen were arrested in the fall of 1964 for conspiratorial and subversive activities. Presbyterian and Episcopal clergymen have also been arrested.

FOREIGN POLICY

In foreign affairs, Castro's main concerns have been four: maintenance of Soviet bloc support, the Sino-Soviet split, the threat of the United States, and the fate of Castroite revolutions in Latin America. The Russians are continuing their support but, as we have seen, are exacting their price in changes in economic policy. In the future even more Soviet influence can be expected in the economy. From the beginning, there has been no real question about Castro's dependence upon the Soviet Union forcing him ultimately to take its side in any arguments with the

Chinese. Originally, Castro hoped to sustain a position of neutrality and he did follow that posture for several years. But, it is also clear that the Sino-Soviet split worried the Cubans precisely because they wished to continue good relations with both sides; with the Russians because of economic, military, and diplomatic dependence and with the Chinese because of mutual agreement on the proper tactics for spreading revolution. The Cubans printed the statements and proclamations of both sides, and Castro's public pronouncements usually hewed to a centrist position.

Cuban-Chinese relations reached a low point in early 1965 as a consequence of the meeting of Latin American orthodox Communist parties at Havana in late 1964. The parties' representatives called for the unity of the world Communist movement, the immediate cessation of the Chinese-Soviet public debate, and meetings of Communist parties for discussion. Moreover, they condemned splinter parties in Latin America—a direct reference to the few pro-Chinese parties in the southern hemisphere. The agreement did call for support of the Cuban Revolution but endorsed the violent (Cuban) road to power only for Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti. For the Cubans there were some gains in this agreement, not the least of which was the holding of such a meeting in Havana as a symbol of Cuba's importance in the Communist world. For the Chinese there were no gains, and despite visits to China by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Ernesto Guevara to explain away Cuban actions, they persist in regarding this meeting as a slap in the face.

These trends and events in Cuba make it possible to place Guevara's disappearance in 1965 in context, despite Castro's refusal to explain the actual reasons for it. Castro replaced Guevara as the minister of industries and announced in October that Guevara had resigned his military rank, his party membership and his honorary Cuban citizenship in order that he might carry on the revolutionary battle elsewhere. It is also known that Guevara never approved of the decision to

switch from industrialization to sugar and that he did not agree with the decentralization of administration. These two drastic changes in policy were major defeats for him. Another was the failure of his proteges at the ministerial level to be appointed to the new central committee when all others at that level were so rewarded.

CUBAN REFUGEES

The tensions and problems in Cuba give some clues to the reasons for Castro's offer to let Cubans flee to the United States in the fall of 1965. Obviously, one purpose was propaganda, for Castro claimed that it was not he who had prevented Cubans from going, but the United States. Another motivation was probably the desire to ease the economic burden of maintaining the old, the ill, and the very young. Castro stipulated that men of draft age would not be permitted to go. Despite various large-scale departures since 1959, the population of Cuba has grown to an estimated 7.2 million. An additional reason was concern over elements opposed to the regime. Among the people likely to go were middle and upper class individuals who had lost their wealth (about 18 per cent of the population according to government estimates) and government workers fired during the antibureaucracy campaign. The regime must have concluded that these recalcitrants were not convertible into loyal workers for the revolution; they continued to make Havana, in particular, a Sodom in the eyes of the revolutionary leadership.

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BOOK REVIEWS

RECENT BOOKS ON LATIN AMERICA

CASTROISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE. BY THEODORE DRAPER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 253 pages, foreword and index, \$5.95.)

In *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities* (1962), Theodore Draper provided an extremely astute analysis of the Cuban revolution. Now in this very valuable study, he offers a more detailed analysis of the nature of Castroism. He scrutinizes Castro's speeches and public pronouncements and his revolutionary tactics and government policies, in order to define Castroism and its relationship to communism. He follows the twists and turns of Castro's declared ideas and his political and economic actions and concludes that Castroism does not have an ideology of its own, but has a distinctive tactic. He states: "Historically, then, Castroism is a leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power and power in search of ideology." He views Castro as a new type of *caudillo* who needs to justify his power ideologically.

Mr. Draper rejects the idea that the Cuban revolution was a peasant, working class or middle class revolution. Instead he terms it a *declassé* revolution whose leader has used one class or another or a combination of classes for different purposes at different times. He categorizes Castro as belonging to "a leadership type, not unprecedented in this century, which establishes a direct, personal, almost mystical relationship with the masses that frees him from dependence on the classes."

With regard to Castroism's relationship to communism he is of the opinion that the Cuban Communist state is not a replica

of any other Communist state. He demonstrates that Cuban relations with the Soviets and the Chinese have been a "mixture of practical dependence and independent ambitions." Within Cuba, the Communist Party has shared the fate of all those who have helped Castro to power and tried to use him. It has paid a heavy price to learn that Castro does not share power. He points out that the "world Communist movement as we have known it has been based primarily on ideology and organization. . . . It has never before tried to assimilate a charismatic leader of the Castro type who seemed to present it with a ready-made revolution." Finally, he believes that Castroism's "most distinguishing characteristic has been an imminent violence which turns inward as readily as outward. And this excess of violence may well prove to be its undoing."

In an appendix Mr. Draper deals with Senator Fulbright's speech of March 25, 1964, and United States-Cuban policy.

ORGANIZED LABOR IN LATIN AMERICA. BY ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. (New York: The Free Press, 1965. 264 pages, foreword, preface, bibliographical note and index, \$5.95.)

This excellent and comprehensive study will be indispensable to students of Latin American affairs. It provides the most detailed examination of the labor movement in the Latin American countries published to date. In 14 chapters, Professor Alexander traces the history of trade unionism in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, Hispaniola, Mexico, Central America and in the non-republican areas of the Caribbean. Additional chapters

deal with the economic and social background of organized labor in the area, the politicalization of Latin American organized labor, collective bargaining and its substitutes and international trade union organizations in the Americas.

Professor Alexander points out that "organized labor in Latin America has had an essentially revolutionary role. It has been part of the movement for basic economic, social and political change." From its beginning, it has been faced with the problem of a rapid and long-continuing inflation and it has had to help to transform backward farm laborers into modern industrial workers. Finally, Latin American labor has been "peculiarly prone to political influence and control throughout its history. Few unions are completely free from the control of some party or government."

COLOMBIA TODAY—AND TOMORROW. BY PAT M. HOLT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 197 pages, preface, map, tables, bibliography and index, \$5.50.)

Mr. Holt surveys the land, people and history of Colombia as an introduction to his more detailed discussion of the contemporary political, social and economic scene. He details the events which led to the establishment of the National Front and evaluates the effectiveness of the system. Since it offers no place for a loyal opposition and no outlet for political frustration he feels its survival will depend largely on its ability "to govern in such a way as to create a minimum of frustration." This is a crucial long-term problem for Colombia. Other problems which threaten stability in Colombia include the rate of economic growth—so far it has been sufficient to allow a certain flexibility in Colombian society—and Colombia's population growth, which is estimated at 2.9 per cent per year. The present growth is almost entirely accounted for by a decrease in the death rate, as the birth rate has remained fairly steady.

In his survey, Mr. Holt also examines the state of the coffee industry, agricultural problems and the status of industry, labor and finance. He describes the vicious banditry which has plagued the countryside for many years. Evidence seems to indicate that until 1964 the banditry was mainly indigenous but there are now indications that Communist-inspired terrorism represents an increasing part of the rural violence. An interesting chapter deals with the functioning of the Peace Corps in Colombia. The author believes it is too soon to make an estimate of its effectiveness, but is of the opinion that its success will depend on the extent to which it can inspire the Colombian villagers to participate in community activity—a concept totally strange and foreign.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICA. BY WENDELL C. GORDON. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965. 357 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$8.75.)

In the preface to this challenging study, Professor Gordon states: "The descriptive material of the book is oriented around the argument that substantial change is necessary in Latin America if the development of the region is to be accelerated. But the Latin Americans themselves will have to be the chief architects of these institutional changes."

Part One of the study offers an interpretation of the economic history of the area. Part Two deals with the behavior of business enterprise, of the market and business-government relations. Part Three views the economy from the standpoint of the people. Part Four is concerned with economic development and Part Five with trade and finance.

Professor Gordon sees the improvement of marketing facilities as one of the major problems of Latin America. The banking practices and corporate management practices common to Latin America he regards as severe handicaps to economic develop-

ment. And he describes the tendency of the privileged "to resist fanatically any minor abatement of their privileges" as "a heavy hand stifling the progress of Latin America." He discounts the theory that a lack of capital is an important cause of the area's slow economic development. Instead he suggests that what is needed is "technology (including effective management methods) and financial institutions adequate for channeling capital funds to the promoters in a position to put them to work constructively."

PERU'S OWN CONQUEST. By FERNANDO BELAUNDE-TERRY. (Lima, Peru: American Studies Press, S.A., 1965. 219 pages, \$6.95.)

The president of Peru forcefully states his conviction that the Peruvians must conquer their own territory and weld their nation together, bridging cultural chasms and subduing defiant topography. He expresses his firm belief that Peruvians must search their past and absorb the lessons to be learned from its ancient traditions if Peru is to develop a workable system for its future. The ancient Incan roads which traverse the country, the magnificent ruins now surrounded by jungle and the remains of the vast irrigation systems in lands now desolate and bare are evidence that the terrain can be conquered.

President Belaunde-Terry says "those who go abroad to seek guiding ideas without realizing that they abound within our borders and . . . those who do not believe there are lessons to be learned from our past . . . are like disoriented old men looking for the glasses they have been wearing all the while."

"I would like to maintain in the Peru of today," he states, "the same cohesion that existed in the Peru of long ago, a real miracle in light of the communications problems; to apply the same ethics to food supply; to fan the still burning flame of cooperative spirit as expressed in the *minka*." He feels that the decadence of

Peru's small hamlets is not incurable, that the country has a natural defense to fight this ailment, "the ancient custom of *cooperación popular* (community action), the old *minka* which made the Empire great." He rejects as a cause for Peru's backwardness a chronic scarcity of fiscal resources. Such an excuse is not admissible, he says, "in a country whose tradition is one of having been forged on the basis of human resources."

President Belaunde-Terry also outlines his road-colonization theory, his proposal for the Marginal Forest Highway to link the Andean nations, and his proposals for land, credit and monetary reform.

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN CHILE. By ERNST HALPERIN. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 246 pages, preface, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

Ernst Halperin sees the United States failure to prevent Soviet economic and military aid to Castro and its unwillingness to face up to the "real threat in Latin America, which was the Soviet Union and not little Cuba," as having had a "galvanizing effect on Latin American nationalism." Castroite movements quickly sprang up in every Latin American country and the tide of extreme nationalism and communism continued to rise until the United States confronted the Soviets directly in the Cuban missile crisis. This tide began to recede as soon as "the false impression of American weakness and Soviet superiority" was dispelled.

Mr. Halperin's study of the Chilean left from 1960 until its defeat in 1964, by Eduardo Frei's Christian Democrats illustrates this theory. The political system of Chile is examined and the basic differences between the Castroite groups of extreme nationalists and the Communists are outlined. The character, history and tactics of the Chilean Communist Party are fully explored and particular attention is given to the effect of the Comintern's anti-fascist

Popular Front strategy on the Communist role in the Chilean political arena. The history of the Chilean Socialists and their relationships with the Communists in the last few decades are also thoroughly examined, and the character of the Christian Democrats is defined.

CENTRAL AMERICA. By MARIO RODRÍGUEZ. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. 158 pages, preface, maps, suggested readings and index, \$4.95.)

In four interpretative essays in this volume of the Modern Nations in Perspective series, Professor Rodríguez deals with the historical forces which have shaped the republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. He analyzes the social and racial tensions and other forces which have caused division and unrest in the area, and he evaluates the factors which provide hope for a more peaceful and prosperous future. He treats United States relations with the area and deplores the predilection of the United States to support military dictatorships in Central America. He cautions that while this policy may satisfy temporary strategic requirements, in the long run it will threaten the success of the Alliance for Progress and serve to strengthen the extremists, ultranationalists and Communists.

ADMINISTRATION OF A REVOLUTION: EXECUTIVE REFORM IN PUERTO RICO UNDER GOVERNOR TUGWELL, 1941-1946. By CHARLES T. GOODSSELL. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965. 206 pages, foreword, illustrations, notes and index, \$4.95.)

As Carl J. Friedrich points out in his foreword, Professor Goodsell's book is an extremely welcome addition to the growing literature about Puerto Rico's transformation because there never has been a full study of Rexford Tugwell's "extraordinarily imaginative and selfless service which provided the turning point from

colonial misery and decay to self-government and astounding economic progress." Tugwell's term as governor of Puerto Rico coincided with the years of World War II. German submarine warfare had played havoc with the island's precarious economy which was dependent on United States imports. There was a severe shortage of food, fuel and other necessities. Lack of fuel and imported raw materials caused widespread shutdowns and layoffs and the number of unemployed swelled alarmingly. In describing the situation to Washington on June 12, 1942, Tugwell said: "Economic life is practically paralyzed."

Under such circumstances it would seem highly improbable that any permanent reform could be accomplished. But that very spring, the Puerto Rican legislature passed a great portion of the legislation which laid a foundation for the island's social and economic revolution. The scope of the legislative program was reminiscent of the First Hundred Days of the Roosevelt administration. How the new laws and agencies created by the legislature were converted into meaningful action is the subject of Professor Goodsell's interesting and valuable book.

CONTEMPORARY CULTURES AND SOCIETIES OF LATIN AMERICA. By DWIGHT B. HEATH, with RICHARD N. ADAMS. (New York: Random House, 1965. 588 pages and index, \$8.95.)

This is a collection of some of the best recent studies of Latin America by social scientists in a variety of disciplines.

THE UNFINISHED EXPERIMENT. DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. By JUAN BOSCH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 236 pages and index, \$5.95.)

Former President of the Dominican Republic Juan Bosch wrote this study while in exile in Puerto Rico, focusing on the period from Trujillo's assassination in May, 1961, to May, 1964. The civil war of 1965 is not covered in this account.

T.M.B.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Report on Panama Treaty Negotiations

On September 24, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave a progress report on the negotiations between the United States and the Republic of Panama in regard to a new treaty to replace the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty of 1903. Excerpts from the White House statement covering the five basic areas of agreement follow:

I have today an announcement of special importance regarding the progress of treaty negotiations with Panama.

In the past 18 months representatives of the United States and the Republic of Panama have been conducting negotiations concerning the Panama Canal. . . .

Today I am happy to announce that areas of agreement have been successfully reached. I am very proud of Ambassadors Robert Anderson and [John N.] Irwin, who spoke for the United States of America. I am very grateful to Ambassadors [Ricardo] Arias, [Diogenes] de la Rosa, and [Roberto] Aleman, who spoke for Panama. They have proven again the truth of our deepest conviction—that nations can resolve their differences honorably and reasonably, without violence and conflict.

At this very moment President [Marco A.] Robles of Panama is announcing to his own people the areas of agreement which our two countries have now reached. They are the following:

In order to meet their present and future needs the two countries are negotiating separately a new and a modern treaty to replace the 1903 treaty and its amendments—a base-rights and status-of-forces agreement—and a treaty under which there might be constructed across Panama a new sea-level canal.

The two countries recognize that the primary interest of both countries lies in insuring that arrangements are provided for effective operations and defense of the existing Panama Canal and any new canal which may be constructed in Panama in the future.

With respect to the status of the negotiations on a new treaty to replace the 1903 treaty and its amendments, general areas of agreement have been reached. The details of these areas of agreement are the subject of current negotiations.

The purpose is to insure that Panama will share with the United States responsibility in the ad-

ministration, management, and the operation of the canal as may be provided in the treaty. Panama will also share with the United States in the direct and the indirect benefits from the existence of this canal on its territory.

The areas of agreement reached are the following:

1. The 1903 treaty will be abrogated.

2. The new treaty will effectively recognize Panama's sovereignty over the area of the present Canal Zone.

3. The new treaty will terminate after a specified number of years or on or about the date of the opening of the sea-level canal, whichever occurs first.

4. A primary objective of the new treaty will be to provide for an appropriate political, economic, and social integration of the area used in the canal operation with the rest of the Republic of Panama. Both countries recognize that there is a need for an orderly transition to avoid abrupt and possibly harmful dislocations. We also recognize that certain changes should be made over a period of time. The new canal administration will be empowered to make such changes in accordance with the guidelines in the new treaty.

5. Both countries recognize the important responsibility they have to be fair and helpful to the employees of all nationalities who are serving so efficiently and well in the operation of this very important canal. Appropriate arrangements will be made to insure that the rights and the interests of these employees are safeguarded.

The new treaties will provide for the defense of the existing canal and any sea-level canal which may be constructed in Panama. United States forces and military facilities will be maintained under a base-rights and status-of-forces agreement.

With respect to the sea-level canal, the United States will make studies and site surveys of possible routes in Panama. Negotiations are continu-

ing with respect to the methods and the conditions of financing, constructing, and operating a sea-level canal, in the light of the importance of such a canal to the Republic of Panama, to the United States of America, to world commerce, and to the progress of all mankind.

The United States and Panama will seek the necessary solutions to the economic problems which

would be caused by . . . a sea-level canal.

The present canal and any new canal which may be constructed in the future shall be open at all times to the vessels of all nations on a non-discriminatory basis. The tolls would be reasonable in the light of the contribution of the Republic of Panama and the United States of America and of the interests of world commerce. . . .

O.A.S. on the Dominican Republic

At the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States—in Washington, D.C. on the troubled situation in the Dominican Republic—a resolution establishing an inter-American force for the Dominican Republic was adopted on May 6, 1965. The text of this resolution (passed 15-5, with 1 abstention) follows:

Whereas:

This meeting at its session of May 1, established a committee to proceed to the Dominican Republic to seek the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions in the territory of that republic;

The said resolution requests the American Governments and the general secretariat of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation to facilitate the work of the committee;

The formation of an inter-American force will signify ipso facto the transformation of the forces presently in Dominican territory into another force that will not be that of one state or of a group of states but that of the Organization of American States, which organization is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members;

The American states being under the obligation to provide reciprocal assistance to each other, the organization is under greater obligation to safeguard the principles of the Charter and to do everything possible so that in situations such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate measures may be taken, leading to the reestablishment of peace and normal democratic conditions;

The Organization of American States being competent to assist the member states in the preservation of peace and the re-establishment of normal democratic conditions, it is also competent to provide the means that reality and circumstances require and that prudence counsels as adequate for the accomplishment of such purposes; and

The committee of the Organization of American States that proceeded to the Dominican Republic, in its second report to this meeting, advises the formation of an inter-American force to achieve the objectives determined by the meeting of consultation,

The 10th meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs resolves:

1. To request governments of member states that are willing and capable of doing so to make contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of American States, within their capabilities and to the extent they can do so, to form an inter-American force that will operate under the authority of this 10th meeting of consultation.

2. That this force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of co-operating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.

3. To request the commanders of the contingents of forces that make up this force to work out directly among themselves and with a committee of this meeting the technical measures necessary to establish a unified command of the Organization of American States for the coordinated and effective action of the Inter-American Armed Force. In the composition of this force, an effort will be made to see that the national contingents shall be progressively equalized.

4. That at such time as the O.A.S. unified command shall have determined that the Inter-American Armed Force is adequate for the purposes contemplated by the resolution adopted by this meeting on May 1, 1965, the full responsibility of meeting these purposes shall be assumed by that force.

5. That the withdrawal of the Inter-American

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COSTA RICA

(Continued from page 13)

and the frequent cabinet shifts which suggest that scapegoats have had to be found.

Small new parties regularly appear in Costa Rica and almost as regularly gravitate toward older, larger groups. A feminist group, claiming thousands of adherents as it emphasizes social welfare and the needs of children, has recently appeared as a formal political group. Greater prospect of permanence, however, attaches to the new Christian Democratic Party (P.D.C.) because of its ideological affiliation with similar parties in Europe and Latin America.

Meanwhile the political big three have been anticipating the February, 1966, election. Midway through the Orlich administration it became evident that Foreign Minister Daniel Oduber would be the standard bearer of P.L.N. In addition to his successful conduct of the nation's foreign affairs, 44-year-old Oduber, edged out of the party nomination by Orlich in 1962, has his claims upon P.L.N. At the same time younger elements of P.U.N. were concluding that their prospects would brighten if they could divest themselves of the dominating personality of the 70-year-old Otilio Ulate. As it happened, about the time the grand old man of P.U.N. decided to withdraw his candidacy, another political oldster, 65-year-old Rafael Calderón, announced that his Republican Party, out of the presidency since 1948, favored a coalition against the incumbent P.L.N.⁸ The coalition candidate became José Joaquín Trejos, an economist and university professor whose background lists a distinguished San José family long identified with the world of business. For a vigorous attack on Orlich's economic record, he is a capable leader.

Faced by united opposition, P.L.N. began to rethink its strategy. The victory of

Echandi in 1958 had resulted from a P.U.N.-P.R. coalition. The prospect of a repetition of that kind of battle required the strongest candidate that P.L.N. could muster. Accordingly, José Figueres, famous for his role in the democratic revolution of 1948 and as founder of P.L.N., began to be mentioned as a possible replacement for Oduber. Now 59, Figueres is the man who sparked a new concept of dynamic citizenship in Costa Rica, the man whose agreements with United Fruit reconciled the interests of a small nation and a giant foreign corporation, and also the man who occupies a bigger niche in the world scene than does any other mid-century resident of Central America.

Regardless of the fervor inspired by the election, Costa Rica has won and cherishes her political maturity. Through the election—in which possibly 90 per cent of all men and women 20 years of age and older will participate—Costa Ricans hope that the new administration to be inaugurated on May 8, 1966, will be one capable of achieving national economic maturity. In a quiet sort of way, Central America's most progressive nation is striving toward a second kind of independence. Meanwhile, as your eye flits across the Caribbean world—or down the Central American isthmus—and settles upon tiny Costa Rica, remember to color it green—for growth and go.

HONDURAS

(Continued from page 26)

The Peace Corps explained its role in Latin America in an April, 1965, document: "Today, almost 3,400 Peace Corps Volunteers are taking part in Latin America's revolution. At the request of 17 governments, they are helping to shape it, helping to give it direction, acting as conscious instruments of change. Community action workers in the barrios and barriadas, health workers and agriculturalists in the campo, teachers in the universities and secondary schools—all are helping to end what one South American official called a 'century of neglect.'" Hon-

⁸ Invaluable for the study of the political background of contemporary Costa Rica is the *Hispanic American Report*, whose unfortunate demise is a blow to American comprehension of Latin America.

duras is one of the 17 Latin American countries requesting such help from the Peace Corps.

Finally, the United States assists Honduras in combatting subversion and Sino-Soviet-Castro infiltration and insurgency through a military aid program which includes Counter-insurgency and Civic Action training and, from 1950 to 1965, a total of \$4.291 million has been contributed toward this program.

In summary, Honduras faces economic problems of some magnitude: low productivity, heavy dependence on the export of one crop, inadequate infrastructure, high illiteracy, scarcity of technical and administrative skills, and health difficulties in both urban and rural areas (with respect to the lower classes). Political problems include intolerant party politics, the threat of internecine conflict, and political instability promoted and supported by communism through infiltration, subversion, and insurgency.

What are the prospects? It should first be recognized that no country has ever solved all of its problems at once and that some problems persist so intransigently as to become a permanent part of the nation's culture. My own feeling is that it will take a long time, many decades at least, for Honduras to become "modern" in the sense the writers now use this term, no matter who governs and no matter what policies are selected and implemented. Of course, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that as Honduran leaders observe the consequences of modernism in the United States, the Soviet Union, and certain Western European countries they will elect not to become "modern." Honduran leaders are as capable as those of other countries to analyze, compare and initiate the ideas which best fit the circumstances of their own environment. For example, toward the end of the Villeda Morales administration one could discern a certain disenchantment among some leaders of the Liberal party with the state interventionist policies they had been following. Indeed, the laws passed in 1963 dealing with agriculture, forestry, and petroleum were designed to induce more private investment.

At the present time, an administration is in power which supports the market mechanism. Honduras is enjoying at least the beginnings of a boom, and it will undoubtedly continue for the foreseeable future, especially as the Central American Common Market becomes fully operative. If this administration should choose to free the economy even more from governmental restrictions, regulations, and controls, the rate of growth would, in my opinion, accelerate with the prospect of something approaching permanent prosperity. The responsibility for directing its affairs and determining its future is, of course, that of Honduras alone. However, former President John F. Kennedy was fond of saying that the United States was dedicated to the achievement of a peaceful world of free and independent states. It follows that the United States can play a constructive role in assisting Honduras in the realization of mutually held ideals and objectives.

THE WEST INDIES

(Continued from page 31)

tion. Thus the federation, which had originally been conceived as a strongly centralized federation, began to lose support as the island politicians grew reluctant to yield their own local power. Vere Bird of Antigua has been the most active leader in this process of eroding the proposed power of the federal government. And his reluctance to cooperate has increased as the Antiguan economy, bolstered by tourism and an industrialization program, has given strong signs of continued self-sufficiency in spite of the disastrous drought which has curtailed the sugar production.

Barbados, which is also economically independent of Great Britain, likewise has become impatient with the delay in the plans for the Eastern Caribbean Federation. Prime Minister Errol Barrows, in the fall of 1965, announced the decision of his government to secure separate independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations. In spite of the fact that two ministers resigned from

the cabinet as a result of this announcement, Barbados is sticking to the decision. Thus, in the words of Sir Arthur Lewis, the distinguished St. Lucian economist now at Princeton University, the prospects for a federation in the West Indies are nil for at least a generation, until the present leaders are replaced by more cooperative ones.⁶

There is one glimmer of hope. As Eric Williams indicated in January, 1962, any federation of the West Indies must be accompanied by the creation of a cooperating economic community. As far as Trinidad is concerned no significant success has been realized in this direction; in spite of the fact that the erudite Williams places the blame on foreign interference,⁷ much of the responsibility is his own. However, progress toward economic cooperation is being made, to the real detriment of Trinidad-Tobago, by other communities of the Caribbean. In October, 1965, the prime ministers of British Guiana, Barbados, and Antigua signed a general agreement concerning the structure of a Caribbean Free Trade Area (CAFTA) which other communities may later join.

In summation, and again paraphrasing the isolated scholar from Trinidad, the people of the West Indies have been freed, or are in the process of liberating themselves, from colonialism but a society has not yet been formed. So in place of a great and powerful federation of close to four million people, one finds today the sad spectacle of insignificant power blocs built around the personality of small-island politicians each jealously jostling the other for some small advantage for his own island community.

⁶ See Sir Arthur Lewis, *The Agony of the Eight* (Barbados, West Indies: Advocate Commercial Printery, 1965).

⁷ See *The Nation* of Trinidad, September 24, 1965.

MEXICO: 1966 AND BEYOND

(Continued from page 37)

keeping foreign and indigenous private investment in doubt about where the government intends to make its next move towards

greater state ownership, Díaz Ordaz could specify that state ownership has reached its apex and that from now on the Mexican government will gradually sell much of its ownership in productive enterprise. In this way, too, Mexico would retain and attract more practically creative people who understand development as the production and distribution of more and better things at lower costs.

O.A.S. ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Continued from page 50)

Force from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this meeting.

6. To continue in session in order to keep the situation under review, to receive the report and recommendations of the committee, and in the light thereof to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of democratic order in the Dominican Republic.

7. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution.

THE CHALLENGE IN PANAMA

(Continued from page 7)

Panama could not hope to muster a force sufficient for repelling a major aggressor. Therefore, Panama would have to press for the neutralization, and probably denuclearization, of the region.

How would the sea-level canal be administered? The United States government is on record as favoring international operation of the canal, extra-continental participation in its financing and construction, and wide participation in the determination of access and tolls. Important political figures have declared themselves in favor of internationalization of the transisthmian route. Others have called for its inter-Americanization.

The Panamanian government is in the process of making decisions and redefining relationships that will influence not only the economic life of every present and future citizen of Panama, but may affect the very form of Panama's political system.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of November, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month In Review

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND

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INTERNATIONAL

African-Asian Conference

Nov. 1—The conference of African and Asian nations, scheduled to open in Algiers November 5, is cancelled. This follows Communist China's assertion it would boycott such a meeting if the Soviet Union attended.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Nov. 27—A one-day conference of NATO defense ministers is held in Paris. Three new working committees, concerned with data exchange, communications and nuclear planning, are established.

Organization of American States

Nov. 17—The first full inter-American session since 1954 meets at Rio de Janeiro. Of the 20 O.A.S. members, only Venezuela is not present.

Nov. 22—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk delivers to the Special Inter-American Conference a pledge by President Lyndon Johnson that the U.S. will continue aid for the Alliance for Progress beyond 1970, the original termination date. Rusk announces U.S. support for the establishment of new inter-American machinery to guard against totalitarian takeovers in Latin America.

United Nations

Nov. 1—Officials from 31 nations, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., reach agreement in Bangkok on a charter for a \$1 billion Asian Development Bank. The proposed charter will be submitted for final

approval to the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Near East.

Nov. 2—It is reported that 101 nations have pledged \$147.7 million for projects of the Special Fund and Technical Assistance Program in 1966. Although 30 donors increased their pledges over last year, it is doubted that the goal of \$200 million will be reached.

Nov. 5—The General Assembly, 82 to 9, with 18 abstentions, calls on Britain to suspend Rhodesia's constitution and establish a representative government, using military force if necessary.

In the face of new outbursts of fighting on Cyprus, the Security Council appeals to all parties to refrain from further violence.

The Security Council adopts a resolution demanding "prompt and unconditional" execution of a proposal to speed withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops from the Kashmir area. The Soviet Union and Jordan abstain from voting.

Nov. 11—The General Assembly adopts a resolution calling on Britain to take all necessary steps to end the rebellion by Rhodesia's white minority government. South Africa and Portugal vote against the resolution; France abstains.

Nov. 12—With France abstaining, the Security Council condemns Rhodesia for having seized independence illegally and calls on all nations to deny that country recognition or assistance.

Nov. 16—Secretary General U Thant says that all nations involved should make "major concessions" to make Vietnam peace negotiations possible.

Nov. 17—By a vote of 47-47 (with 20 abstentions and 3 not voting), Communist

China is denied admission to the U.N. A two-thirds vote of approval is needed for China's admission.

Nov. 19—The General Assembly votes 93-0 to urge all countries to take every possible step for an early treaty to end the spread of nuclear weapons. U Thant calls for a meeting "at the foreign ministers level" of "all members" of the Disarmament Committee. France has refused to take part in the meetings.

Nov. 20—The opening session of the biennial Food and Agriculture Organization conference begins in Rome.

The Security Council approves a compromise resolution calling on all states to impose an embargo on oil and petroleum products shipments to Rhodesia.

Nov. 23—The General Assembly's Political Committee approves 91-0 a resolution calling for a world disarmament conference including Communist China. The measure is approved by the U.S.

Nov. 25—The U.S. rejects an appeal by 32 nonnuclear nations to suspend all underground tests of nuclear weapons without requiring onsite inspections.

ARGENTINA

Nov. 22—Lieutenant General Juan Onganía abruptly resigns as commander-in-chief of the military forces. The move is made after the appointment of a man of lower rank, Brigadier General Romulo Sanchez, to the vacant post of war secretary.

BRAZIL

Nov. 4.—In an effort to balance next year's budget, President Humberto Castelo Branco announces higher sales and income taxes coupled with a 35 per cent pay increase to military and civil servant personnel.

Nov. 5—President Castelo Branco submits to Congress a constitutional amendment reducing the number of deputies in the lower house from 409 to 266. The proposal is said to be an economy measure to save on salaries.

Nov. 21—Invoking the revolutionary powers granted him last month to reorganize the

nation's political life, Castelo Branco issues a decree for limited revival of political parties. A right-wing military-civic group, the *Lider*, is ordered dissolved.

Nov. 25—President Castelo Branco warns anti-Communist military leaders to cease their "creeping conspiracy" against his government.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

(See the individual countries listed in alphabetical order.)

CANADA

Nov. 8—In parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Lester Pearson's Liberal Party fails to win a majority in the House of Commons. The Liberals win more seats than any other party (129) but are 5 short of a clear majority. The Conservative Party wins 99 seats; the New Democratic Party, 21.

CHILE

Nov. 6—A Chilean officer is killed and another wounded in a southern frontier area in a clash with Argentine forces. Two policemen are taken captive by Argentine forces.

Nov. 8—The government rushes planeloads of troops to the disputed frontier region.

Nov. 12—In a strong note, the government informs Argentina that the recent border clash was "inexcusable and without precedent in the history of our border conflicts." Each country claims the disputed area lies 20 miles within its own border.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Nov. 10—Peking publishes a 30,000-word article reviewing Chinese-Soviet relations one year after the removal of Nikita Khrushchev as Soviet premier. Present Soviet leaders are accused of seeking Vietnam peace talks that would be prolonged to "allow the U.S. to hang on in South Vietnam indefinitely."

Nov. 18—The government rejects an Indian protest note over a clash between Chinese and Indian troops in Sikkim November 13.

Peking charges that Indian troops intruded into Chinese territory.

Nov. 19—The Communist Party newspaper, *Jenmin Jih Pao*, declares that so long as the U.N. is "controlled" by the U.S. China has no interest in joining the organization.

Nov. 24—The government begins an intensive program urging the people to use less coal.

Nov. 29—Premier Chou En-lai says that "Khrushchev revisionism has betrayed Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," in an attack on Soviet policies.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Nov. 6—After two years, diplomatic relations are resumed between the two Republics of the Congo.

Nov. 14—The cabinet of Premier Evarista Kimba, named by President Joseph Kasavubu, fails to win confirmation in Parliament. The opposition is led by Moise Tshombe, dismissed last month as premier.

Nov. 25—In a bloodless coup, President Kasavubu and Premier Kimba are ousted by Lieutenant General Joseph Mobutu, who declares himself president for the next five years.

Nov. 28—President Joseph D. Mobutu swears in the new government; Leonard Mulamba is premier.

CUBA

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Nov. 1—Premier Fidel Castro declares he expects no general improvement in relations with the U.S. following negotiations over the departure of refugees.

Nov. 7—Following yesterday's agreement with the U.S., the government begins compiling lists of Cubans wishing to leave the country.

Nov. 14—Castro charges that two "pirate gunboats" attacked the Havana waterfront. He attributes the assault to U.S.-based exiles.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nov. 11—A major governmental change is announced in an apparent move to modify

the country's economy and to institute profit and wage incentives. Bohumil Sucharda is named minister and chairman of the state commission for finance, prices and wages. More authority is given to individual factories to set wage and price levels.

DAHOMY

Nov. 29—General Christophe Soglo stages a bloodless coup d'etat, dismissing President Sourou Migari Apithy and Premier Justin Ahomadegbe because the president and the premier cannot agree. He appoints President of the National Assembly Tahiro Congacou as head of a provisional government. This is Soglo's second coup in 25 months.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Nov. 3—In a surprise broadcast, former President Juan Bosch tells Dominicans it is their "duty" to ignore a general strike called by the Communists. He also comes out strongly in support of the O.A.S.-supported Garcia-Godoy government.

Nov. 4—Workers in Santo Domingo ignore a Communist call for a general strike against "Yankee imperialism."

Nov. 22—Troops loyal to provisional President Garcia-Godoy block a rightist civilian attempt to overthrow the government.

Nov. 23—Reports from Santo Domingo indicate senior military officers were involved in yesterday's abortive coup and that steps are being taken to remove these officers.

FRANCE

Nov. 4—President Charles de Gaulle announces he is a candidate for the French presidency and asks the French people to reelect him.

Nov. 17—An independent candidate for the presidency, Paul Antier, withdraws and asks his supporters to back Jean Lecanuet, Catholic Popular Republican candidate.

Nov. 18—High French officials say that North Vietnamese peace feelers sent to the U.S. last May by France cannot be considered "as a valid effort of negotiation."

Nov. 24—De Gaulle hints, at a cabinet meeting, that he may abandon his opposition to British membership in the European Common Market.

Nov. 26—From the missile test center at Hammaguir in the Sahara, France launches its first space satellite, a 92-pound capsule which will transmit radio signals for two weeks.

GREAT BRITAIN

(See *United Kingdom*.)

GREECE

Nov. 16—A major clash between church and state erupts as 700 policemen cordon off the Metropolis Church to prevent entry of bishops arriving for the Greek Orthodox Church Assembly. The dispute centers around moves of the Church to transfer some bishops from poorer dioceses to more wealthy, vacant ones.

Nov. 26—The police are summoned to restore order in the Parliament. The uproar by deputies from the Opposition Center Union and United Democratic Left parties was over the election of parliamentary secretaries.

INDIA

Nov. 13—The government reports that Chinese Communist troops have opened heavy fire on Indian positions on the Sikkim border.

Nov. 18—In the first official confirmation that major fighting is continuing, India announces her troops have cleared Pakistani forces from the area of Rajasthan.

Nov. 23—Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri tells Parliament he has accepted "in principle" a new Soviet offer of "good offices" for talks with Pakistani President Ayub Khan.

INDONESIA

Nov. 3—The army assumes control of the civilian intelligence agency formerly headed by First Deputy Premier Subandrio, reportedly sympathetic to the Communists.

Nov. 5—The People's Consultative Assembly

(parliament) relieves Communist members of their parliamentary functions.

Nov. 10—President Sukarno says that while he is still considering a ban on the Communist Party because of the abortive October 1 coup, Indonesia will have some form of communism in its government so long as he is the country's leader.

Nov. 20—Sukarno tells a meeting of top military commanders he intends to keep the nation aligned with an "anti-imperialist axis" of Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Cambodia.

IRAN

Nov. 1—Two students are sentenced to death by a military tribunal for conspiracy to assassinate Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi on April 13. They are accused of attempting the assassination with the support of a "foreign power," widely interpreted as a reference to Communist China.

Nov. 10—The government recalls its ambassador to Syria and closes its embassy in Damascus because of statements by Syrian officials that the province of Khuzistan in southwestern Iran is part of the "Arab homeland."

IRAQ

Nov. 7—The government of Premier Abdel Rahman announces it will reestablish free enterprise, reconsider the socialist system applied last year and follow a different approach to the problem of the rebellious Kurds.

ISRAEL

Nov. 2—In general elections for the *Knesset*, Premier Levi Eshkol's coalition regime retains control. Former Premier David Ben-Gurion's new party wins 10 seats.

Nov. 4—David Ben-Gurion tells his supporters he will continue to fight the "stupid and corrupt" regime of Premier Eshkol.

JAPAN

Nov. 4—The defense agency announces that for the first time since 1945, the number of men seeking to enlist exceeds the re-

cruitment goals. The rise in enlistments is attributed to an economic recession.

Nov. 6—Opening a campaign to overthrow the government of Premier Eisaku Sato, thousands of students and unionists demonstrate outside the Diet against plans to establish full diplomatic relations with South Korea.

KUWAIT

Nov. 24—The Emir of Kuwait, Sheik Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, dies. Premier Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, a younger brother, is proclaimed ruler by the council of ministers.

LAOS

Nov. 20—Government forces capture a North Vietnamese army officer and kill several soldiers trying to escape from a cave where they had been trapped for a week.

Nov. 23—The army captures 13 North Vietnamese hiding in a cave. Fighting continues between government and pro-Communist forces in the area near Thakhek.

NIGERIA

Nov. 8—Mobs of angered Nigerians protesting last month's election results in the Western Region continue a month of looting and killing. The death toll is officially put at 70, while property damage has been estimated at \$560,000.

Nov. 19—As violence continues, the government arrests and charges the editors of two newspapers with sedition. The papers have reported that in the regional parliamentary election in the Western Region, the opposition party actually won despite a government announcement of its own victory.

PAKISTAN

Nov. 6—The government announces it has sharply lowered its goals for private investment in the next few years. It will channel available foreign and domestic capital into basic industries and into defense production.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Nov. 7—Senator Ferdinand Marcos is elected

president, defeating incumbent President Diosdado Macapagal.

PORTUGAL

Nov. 2—One hundred outstanding Roman Catholics denounce the regime of Premier António de Oliveira Salazar, and support the electoral program of the opposition Social Democratic Party in the forthcoming National Assembly elections.

Nov. 7—The people vote a one-slate ticket for the National Assembly; two weeks ago the opposition candidates withdrew from the contest, charging that the elections would not be honest.

Nov. 16—The government says 74.1 per cent of the electorate voted in favor of Salazar's National Union. A spokesman for the opposition states that there was a 70 per cent abstention from the polls.

RHODESIA

(See also *U.N., Great Britain, Zambia, U.S. Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 11—Prime Minister Ian D. Smith issues a proclamation of independence ending Rhodesia's tie with Great Britain. Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the British governor of Rhodesia, announces he has suspended Smith and his cabinet from office on the Queen's instructions. The Smith government issues a set of emergency regulations, including press and radio censorship, and detains some members of the political opposition.

Nov. 12—The government issues an order divesting Governor Gibbs of all executive power.

Nov. 14—Governor Gibbs announces that he will leave his post only when asked to do so by the Queen.

Nov. 16—Four thousand African postal workers refuse to sign loyalty pledges to the government of Prime Minister Smith. They are given two weeks to sign or be dismissed.

Nov. 18—In the southern city of Bulawayo, 350 African textile workers are dismissed for striking in protest against the unilateral independence. More than 2,000 African

railway workers walk out in an unofficial strike.

Nov. 25—At the first meeting of Parliament since the proclamation of independence, a white opposition leader is ejected for insisting that the Smith government is illegal. Josiah Gondo, leader of the opposition United People's Party, then leaves with eight other African members.

Nov. 26—Prime Minister Smith says he suspects that Communists blew up the pylon disrupting electric service to Zambia earlier today.

RUMANIA

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 21—Austrian diplomats report that Rumania has started exploratory talks with the U.S. and North Vietnam in an effort to bring about negotiations for ending the Vietnam war.

TURKEY

Nov. 11—The new Conservative Justice Party government wins its first vote of confidence in Parliament. Suleyman Demirel officially becomes premier.

Nov. 12—Ankara reveals that the Soviet Union has agreed to undertake seven economic development projects in Turkey for which \$200 million in credits have been extended.

U.S.S.R., THE

Nov. 2—The Soviet Union launches Proton 2, a 13-ton satellite, to study cosmic rays.

Nov. 3—It is revealed that Nikolai Mikhailov, a high official of the Stalin era who held obscure posts under Nikita Khrushchev, has been named to head a major agency that supervises and censors the publishing industry.

Nov. 6—First Deputy Premier Dmitri Polyansky tells an international Communist rally that the Soviet Communist Party has done everything possible to heal the breach with Communist China. He warns that any future moves for conciliation must come from Peking.

Nov. 7—At the annual military parade com-

memorating the Bolshevik revolution, the U.S.S.R. displays three new compact, mobile ground missile systems.

Nov. 12—The Soviet Union launches a spacecraft on a three-month trip to Venus.

Nov. 15—In an unusual move, the government publishes a preview of the 1966 economic plan, to be approved next month by the Supreme Soviet. It calls for increased housing and additional production of consumer goods.

Nov. 16—A second Venus shot is launched.

Pravda replies strongly to Peking's charges that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are working together against China.

Nov. 17—Five U.S. senators, headed by Senate majority leader Michael Mansfield, arrive in Moscow on a fact-finding mission.

The Indian finance minister, in Moscow negotiating for Soviet loans, says the U.S.S.R. has informed India that Pakistani President Ayub Khan is ready to meet on Soviet territory with Indian Prime Minister Shastri to discuss the Kashmir dispute.

Nov. 18—The visiting U.S. senators have a two-hour talk with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Nov. 19—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin meets for two hours with the U.S. senators. No details of the talks are given.

Nov. 24—An American tourist is sentenced by a Soviet court to 18 months in a labor camp for having crossed into a Soviet enclave on the Norwegian border without a visa.

Nov. 25—The Moscow correspondent for the *Washington Post* is expelled, in retaliation for that paper's publication of the purported memoirs of a convicted Soviet spy.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Nov. 25—President Gamal Abdel Nasser tells the National Assembly that there has been a "marked improvement" in relations between the U.A.R. and the U.S. during the past year.

UNITED KINGDOM

(See also *U.N.* and *Rhodesia*)

GREAT BRITAIN

- Nov. 4—Prime Minister Harold Wilson orders Parliament, scheduled to end tomorrow, to remain in session in case Rhodesia decides to declare unilateral independence.
- Nov. 7—The British prime minister asks Ian D. Smith, prime minister of Rhodesia, to meet him again for talks on the independence demands of the white-minority Rhodesian government.
- Nov. 11—Denouncing Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, the government expels Rhodesia from the sterling area, suspends her preferential tariff treatment, imposes controls on all trade and exchanges of currency and bans purchases of Rhodesian tobacco and sugar.
- Nov. 15—The House of Commons approves legislation enabling the government to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia and empowering it to cancel any laws passed in Salisbury since independence.

BRITISH TERRITORIES

British Guiana

- Nov. 2—Formal talks begin in London between British and British Guianan officials on Guianan independence. Despite an appeal from British Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, leader of the largest Guianan political group, refuses to attend.
- Nov. 19—Britain agrees to grant independence to British Guiana on May 26, 1966, at which time the crown colony will take its former name of Guyana.

IRELAND, NORTHERN

- Nov. 25—The ruling Unionist Party, affiliated with the British Conservative Party, increases its majority by winning 36 seats in the 52-seat House of Commons. Prime Minister Terrence O'Neill wins a new five-year term.

UNITED STATES, THE Agriculture

- Nov. 4—President Lyndon B. Johnson names a 30-member National Commission on

Food and Fiber to study U.S. agricultural problems and recommend solutions.

Civil Rights

- Nov. 9—The government asks the Supreme Court to approve federal prosecution in civil rights murders. U.S. district judges have ruled that the 1870 Reconstruction laws cannot be used in murder cases.
- Nov. 10—Dr. Martin Luther King calls for federal laws to establish uniform jury-selection procedures, to make it a federal crime to kill a civil rights worker, and to ban discriminatory hiring practices by state and local courts and law-enforcement agencies.
- Nov. 11—For the first time in the twentieth century in Mississippi, a white man is convicted of the rape of a Negro girl.
- Nov. 13—The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights asks the President to send more federal officers to racial trouble areas and to authorize them to make on-the-spot arrests. It also calls for new laws making it a federal crime to threaten, intimidate or punish persons engaged in civil rights activity.
- Nov. 16—President Johnson promises to ask Congress for legislation aimed at halting "injustice to Negroes at the hands of white juries."
- Nov. 23—A panel of three federal judges in Montgomery, Alabama, rules that the 1965 Voting Rights Act must be presumed constitutional and that state court injunctions against enrolling federally registered voters are null and void.

Economy, The

- Nov. 5—The Aluminum Company of America, the nation's largest aluminum producer, announces a 2 per cent price increase. Last week three other producers announced similar rises.
- Nov. 6—The government announces its plan to release 200,000 tons of aluminum from the national stockpile. Gardner Ackley, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, denounces the industry's price increase as "inflationary" and "unjustified."

Nov. 9—The government authorizes the release of 100,000 tons of aluminum immediately and 200,000 tons in the indefinite future.

Nov. 10—Alcoa announces it is rescinding its price increase. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara says he believes it will be possible to limit the quantity of stock-piled metal which will be released to less than 200,000 tons.

Nov. 19—Anaconda Copper rescinds its recent 2-cent price increase in copper, as does the Phelps-Dodge Corporation. The move follows a government decision to release 200,000 tons of copper to relieve critical shortages of the metal.

Nov. 30—The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor reports a cost of living index rise of .2 per cent in October.

Foreign Policy

Nov. 2—The U.S. accuses the Soviet Union of jeopardizing the cultural-exchange agreement by its recent rejections of certain Broadway musicals, writers and artists scheduled to visit Russia.

A Quaker pacifist, troubled over U.S. policy in Vietnam, burns himself to death in front of the Pentagon.

Nov. 3—It is revealed that during last week's tension over Rhodesian independence, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Ian Smith warning that such action might lead to U.S. economic reprisals.

Nov. 4—Princess Margaret of Britain and her husband, the Earl of Snowden, arrive in the U.S. for a three-week visit.

Nov. 6—Cuba and the U.S. reach agreement on a monthly airlift of 3,000 to 4,000 Cuban refugees. Scheduled to start December 1, the U.S. will fly two daily flights from Cuba.

President Johnson says the Cuban airlift agreement does not indicate any thaw in relations between Havana and Washington.

Nov. 9—A young Roman Catholic pacifist burns himself to death in front of the U.N.

building to protest U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Nov. 11—Secretary of State Dean Rusk says the U.S. "deplores" the unilateral action of Rhodesia in announcing its independence. The U.S. consul general is recalled and the U.S. Information Agency office is closed.

Nov. 13—*The New York Times* reports that the Johnson administration is trying to keep secret the testimony of its witnesses on the Dominican crisis before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Nov. 15—The State Department confirms that a year ago the U.S. rejected an offer by North Vietnam to meet with U.S. officials in Burma to discuss ending the war in South Vietnam. The offer was rejected, the State Department says, because the U.S. did not believe the North Vietnamese were seriously interested in peace.

Nov. 17—The State Department confirms that a second North Vietnamese offer to confer with U.S. officials on South Vietnam was received in May through French officials.

Nov. 18—President Johnson names a U.S. mediator in an attempt to settle a century-old dispute between Britain and Guatemala over their rival claims to British Honduras.

Nov. 20—Protesting U.S. policy in South Vietnam, 8,000 persons march from Berkeley, to Oakland, California.

The U.S. tells the U.N. Security Council that it is suspending the 1965 sugar quota for Rhodesia. The 9,500-ton quota, now on the high seas for the U.S., will not be accepted.

Nov. 22—The chairman of the House armed services committee, L. Mendel Rivers, calls on the U. S. administration to widen and intensify the bombing of North Vietnam.

The White House confirms that U.S. nuclear warheads have been made available to 9 NATO allies. The statement adds that the U.S. retains ultimate control over their use.

The State Department denies reports that Rumania has offered to mediate in the Vietnamese war. It acknowledges that

- the U. S. has discussed the Vietnamese situation with Rumanian officials.
- Nov. 23—The State Department reveals that the U. S. has turned down a request from Ghana for \$127 million in surplus food. The refusal follows publication of a book by President Kwame Nkrumah criticizing U.S. policies.
- Nov. 27—Defense Secretary McNamara, attending a Paris meeting of NATO defense ministers, say the U.S. will increase its total of nuclear warheads in Europe by 20 per cent within six months.
- Nov. 28—Chaired by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, a 4-day White House Conference on International Cooperation opens.

Government

(See also *Economy*, and *Politics*)

- Nov. 1—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John Gardner assures Miami officials they will receive federal help in coping with the 3,000 to 4,000 refugees expected to arrive monthly from Cuba.

John Gardner appoints a special committee to review Public Health Service activities and their relationship to similar functions of other governmental agencies.

- Nov. 2—The second trial of the Communist Party begins. It is charged with failure to register as an agent of the Soviet Union.

The Civil Service Commission reports that total federal employment stands at 2.88 million, with Negroes comprising 13 per cent of this force.

- Nov. 3—Lawrence F. O'Brien, long-time aide to John F. Kennedy and President Johnson, is sworn in as Postmaster General.

- Nov. 4—The House Committee on Un-American Activities hears testimony that a 1958 Ku Klux Klan convention made plans to burn school buildings.

The White House Conference on Health calls on the federal government to help provide birth control devices and instructions to underprivileged families.

- Nov. 8—President Johnson signs the three-year, \$2.3 billion Higher Education Act, providing scholarships, loans and work opportunities for college students.

- Nov. 9—President Johnson proclaims November 28 as "a day of dedication and prayer" for all anti-Communist forces in Vietnam.

The President orders an immediate, complete investigation of the spectacular power failure that has cut off electricity for metropolitan New York, Boston and much of the northeast for up to 13½ hours.

Congressional hearings on the Ku Klux Klan are suspended. Chairman Edwin Willis says the committee had intended to question witnesses about the 1964 slaying of Negro Reserve Officer Lemuel Penn until Attorney General Katzenbach indicated such testimony might prejudice litigation in the case now before the Supreme Court.

- Nov. 10—The Treasury Department announces a reorganization of the top officers of the Secret Service. The changes are a direct result of the Warren Commission's investigations of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

- Nov. 15—A three-judge federal court in Washington voids the provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act permitting Puerto Ricans to vote on the basis of literacy in Spanish. The court holds the provision is congressional interference with the rights of states to impose their own standards for voting.

- Nov. 17—Defense Secretary McNamara announces that the government will sell 200,000 tons of stockpiled copper to ease a copper shortage and relieve upward pressure on prices. All but one domestic producer this month announced a copper price increase from 36 to 38 cents a pound. (See also *Economy*.)

A White House preliminary conference on civil rights opens. Keynote speaker Philip Randolph, of the Sleeping Car Porters Union, calls for a \$100 billion program to eradicate slums.

- Nov. 18—A Senate commerce subcommittee opens hearings on anonymous recorded telephone messages that attack public figures.

- Nov. 19—The heads of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People and the National Urban League make a statement endorsing Robert Weaver for the unfilled post of Secretary of the new Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler warns that the government is going to adopt a tougher policy toward any price and wage increases it deems inflationary.

A federal district court rules that the Communist Party is guilty of failing to register with the Government as an agent of the Soviet Union, as it is required to do by the Internal Security Act of 1950. The Party is fined \$230,000.

Nov. 23—The Agriculture Department offers to sell high-protein wheat to avert a possible rise in the price of bread.

Nov. 26—President Johnson names Eugene R. Black as head of the U.S. delegation to the conference founding the Asian Development Bank scheduled to meet in Manila December 2-4.

Nov. 27—White House sources estimate that federal spending for fiscal 1966 will reach between \$105 and \$107 billion, with revenue at \$97 billion. The original Administration estimate of \$99.7 billion has been revised because of the expenses of the war in Vietnam.

Labor

Nov. 18—Production of the Gemini spacecraft is halted as 17,000 machinists at the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation in St. Louis initiate a wildcat strike in a wage dispute.

Nov. 22—McDonnell machinists attached to Cape Kennedy, Florida, agree to return to work to avert any delay in next month's Gemini space shots.

Nov. 24—Machinists ratify a new wage contract at the McDonnell Corporation and agree to return to work.

Military

Nov. 9—Secretary of Defense McNamara sets 18 as the minimum age for active service in Vietnam. The armed forces have until

February 1, 1966, to transfer any 17-year-olds out of the area.

Nov. 11—After conferring with President Johnson, Defense Secretary McNamara says that steps will be taken to close additional unneeded military bases at home and abroad, with annual savings of \$500 million.

Nov. 13—Despite congressional opposition, Secretary McNamara announces that plans to abolish 751 army reserve units will be carried out immediately.

Politics

Nov. 2—Republican John Lindsay is elected mayor of New York, defeating Democrat Abraham Beame and Conservative William Buckley.

In Philadelphia, Arlen Specter, a Democrat running as a Republican, is elected district attorney.

In closely-watched contests, Democrats retain control of the governorships of New Jersey and Virginia.

The Democrats win control of both houses of the New Jersey legislature, retain control of the Virginia legislature and receive a 2-1 dominance in the Kentucky legislature.

In New York, the Republicans regain control of the state Senate, but the Democrats retain control in the House.

Nov. 5—At the Western States Republican Conference, National Chairman Ray Bliss calls on all GOP members to reject membership in radical organizations. He invites the Democratic Party to take a similar position "toward all extremists."

Francis X. Morrissey asks President Johnson to withdraw his nomination to a U.S. District Court judgeship. The president says he will comply.

Nov. 9—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower is hospitalized in Georgia with a mild heart attack.

Nov. 11—Harry Byrd of Virginia resigns from the U.S. Senate. He will be succeeded as chairman of the Finance Committee by Russell Long of Louisiana.

Nov. 12—Harry Byrd, Jr., is appointed to

succeed his father in the U.S. Senate.

Nov. 21—Former Vice President Nixon predicts that the Vietnam war may be a major issue in the 1968 election unless the Administration takes steps "to win the war and to end it."

Nov. 23—In a special election for the reapportioned Vermont state legislature, the Republicans retain control in both houses.

Supreme Court

Nov. 15—In an 8-to-0 opinion, the Court rules that individuals may invoke their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to register as members of the Communist Party.

VATICAN, THE

Nov. 18—Two major decrees are promulgated by Ecumenical Council Vatican II. One, "On Divine Revelation," narrows the separation between Catholics and Protestants on the importance of Bible and tradition and also sanctions modern techniques of Scriptural study. The second, the "Apostolate of the Laity," enlarges and emphasizes the role of laymen in the work of the Church.

Nov. 19—The prelates of the Roman Catholic Church at the Ecumenical Council vote overwhelmingly for adoption of a positive concept of religious liberty as church doctrine to replace the former concept of "toleration."

VIETNAM (NORTH)

Nov. 23—The official Chinese Communist news agency, *Hsinhua*, reports that President Ho Chi Minh has reasserted his demand that all U.S. troops leave South Vietnam as a condition for any peace settlement. The North Vietnamese president's demands are included in a November 17 letter he wrote to U.S. scientist Linus C. Pauling.

VIETNAM (SOUTH)

Nov. 11—Ending a three-day official visit to Korea, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky says he will never sit down at a negotiating table with North Vietnamese officials.

Nov. 19—Five days of sustained bitter fighting in the Iadrang River valley area 200 miles north of Saigon indicate a major change in the character of the war. Departing from previous tactics, troops said to be North Vietnamese regulars refuse to yield ground and repeatedly attack U.S. forces, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides.

Nov. 24—The heaviest U.S. death toll for any single week in Vietnam is announced, with 240 killed. The enemy is estimated to have lost a thousand men in the Iadrang Valley action.

YEMEN

Nov. 23—The two opposing republican and royalist factions in the three-year civil war meet in an effort to end their differences and try to form a coalition government. Representatives of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, the backers of the two warring factions, also attend the conference.

ZAMBIA

Nov. 11—President Kenneth Kaunda declares a state of emergency following Rhodesia's declaration of independence. He charges there has been a large buildup of white Rhodesian troops along the river border which separates the two countries.

Nov. 12—Zambian troops are moved up to the area bordering Rhodesia.

Nov. 26—An explosion destroying a pylon on the power line from the Rhodesian border affects three-fourths of the electric power serving Zambia's copper mining belt. A second explosion fails to destroy its pylon target. Authorities blame Rhodesian saboteurs and President Kaunda renews demands for British military support for Zambia.

Nov. 29—It is reported in London that Britain will send at least a token force of aircraft to Zambia in response to Kaunda's request.

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